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INTELLIGENT LIVING

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BY *Austen Fox Riggs*, M. D.

With an Introduction by

Dr. Frederick Tilney



*"What is not good for the swarm
is not good for the bee."*

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P R E F A C E

Is CIVILIZATION wrong? Is it wrong even from a biological point of view? Should we see to it that we breed only for conformation, wind, or speed, as we do in horses, or for sensitive instinctive reactions and easily trained docility, as we do in dogs? And to be entirely logical, should we really kill off such crippled, imperfect examples as escaped our eugenic net and turn our elders, who through the inroads of old age have been rendered useless, into fertilizer and soap fat?

From a purely materialistic and narrowly efficient point of view, civilization is certainly wrong, for as it advances it takes greater and greater care of the unfit, the weak, and even the quite useless aged. It is illogical, perhaps, in not accepting the aims of the cattle breeders, for theirs would certainly be a very handsome world; all the women uniform in beauty; all the men

perfect in stalwart strength and brawn; no cripples, no aged, plenty of fertilizer and soap fat. But what a world to live in! No sympathy, no reaching out a helping hand, and no being helped! No need for any of these, for it would be a simple, primitive life where the physiological and vegetative world reigned supreme; a physical Utopia without hope or possibility of further progress.

Nevertheless, is civilization with its idealism wrong? Is it even biologically wrong? Cannot the strictly utilitarian biologist find in idealism yet another adaptive mechanism of the human race, as natural and necessary as language and equally with it significant of a broadening and strengthening of the reign of intelligence? At all events, psychology as well as ethics must so consider it, for the problems of applied psychology deal with the individual's struggle to adapt himself to his environment, especially to his social environment created by modern life, that is, to civilization, the main factors of which are human relations. So to the individual, civilization means not just modern conveniences such

as aëroplanes, safety razors, and washing machines, not physical perfection, but *idealism*, the developing and valuing of his own individuality, in terms chiefly of his usefulness, his serviceability to mankind, for the ideal of service is to fit into one's environment as constructively as possible, to "pull one's weight in the boat," the boat's progress being always toward a better civilization, where more of the less fit are made more fit, and where the unfit are fewer because of wiser prevention of disease and accidents.

This pictures a far more complex world than that of the perfect animal community, and, if we approve of civilization, we must lay our individual plans accordingly, learning to adapt our primitive and savage selves to a life growing more and more complex in conditions and details but ever simpler in purpose and object. Simpler, yes, but much more difficult, for the conflict narrows itself down to such questions as: civilization or myself?—humanity or myself?—myself or my country?—my family or myself?—my friend or myself?—a conflict always between natural self-seeking, self-protective human in-

instincts and the demanding ideal of unselfish service which is essential to civilization. With the increasing complexity of life this conflict becomes more frequent, more darkly cloaked with confusing and warring "ifs" and "buts." To see the issues involved requires the use of greater intelligence, which in its turn makes possible further progress toward some far-distant goal of perfection. How shall we maintain this pace? With each advance, adaptation to the new conditions thus created becomes more difficult, more and more a matter of intelligence, and errors in judgment, consequently, prove more expensive to the individual and are more surely resented by his fellows. Where shall we look for help? Man's vegetative life is safer than it has ever been; his physical well-being is guarded on every side; great advances have been made in controlling bodily disease; material victories tread closely upon each other's heels; he has all but annihilated spatial obstacles to communication and has become almost independent of weather conditions. His mechanical triumphs are countless, each one a complete victory in

itself, standing out clean-cut and finished, but the problem yet unsolved and always there challenging his intelligence is the social one created by his self-made civilization.

The ever-growing realization of the practical reality of this peculiarly personal and at the same time peculiarly universal problem is no doubt one of the chief factors at the root of the modern demand for psychological knowledge, a demand which not only bespeaks a great need but creates the fertile field in which much rank nonsense grows and flourishes and offers an unparalleled opportunity to the psychological goldbrick swindler. Ask in any bookstore for the Psychological Department and you will find an amazing amount of space devoted to treatises on such a variety of subjects that, no matter what your difficulty, whether an insufficient income or a dread disease, child training or marital dissatisfaction, you may find a choice of remedies offered ranging from dietary reforms to memory culture, from posture to prayer. There is a large sale for this type of book and, among them all, only an occasional one of real

worth smothered among the mass of honest and dishonest amateur trash. These books are widely read and the confusion of ideas consequent upon this rush of amateurs into the field of abnormal psychology is distressing. The poor human psyche is called upon to play every sort of leading part from prophecy in a transcendentially nonsensical new religion to the protean rôle of that crawling sexual beast, the Freudian wish.

Why this flood of pseudo-psychological literature? Is it not simply the law of demand and supply at work? There is a great and ever-growing demand for this knowledge because it is becoming more and more necessary as civilization advances and adaptation to its changing conditions becomes increasingly difficult. So far, this need has been met largely by amateur adventurers who have rushed into this new psychological country, this promised land, bringing back tales of conquest and discovery as wild and varied as are the adventurers themselves. Fortunately, however, scientific expeditions have also gone forth slowly, carefully, conservatively, as is the manner of science, gradually settling the known

borderland of the unexplored, making their unadvertised and unembellished reports to their own fellows and leaving the rest of mankind to the undivided and untroubled attention of the adventurous amateurs and exploiters.

Now, surely, the time is ripe for science and especially medical science to enter the educational field. It is high time that the already considerable body of psychological knowledge, gathered by the slow and sober methods of scientists, should be placed at the disposal of anyone and everyone. There is plenty of reliable information for the psychologically thirsty, much more than there seems opportunity for the teacher to teach or the already busy student to learn. The sober scientific truths are neither weird, nor "psychic," nor fascinatingly fantastic; they are too simple and straightforward even to look coquettish and therefore make no popular appeal, but they are there, behind all the catch-penny rubbish, waiting for those who really need them, who really want them for use. For such they hold more true inspiration and help than there is emotional afflatus in the pseudo-nonsense of all

the doctrinaires added together. This knowledge is practical; a large part of it is applicable to every-day life and is definitely needed by most of us in this modern, hurrying, speed-crazy world. It is needed as a preventive against those peace- and health-destroying elements with which modern life is beset. Just as civilization must always guard itself, particularly against such diseases as its very nature produces, by establishing more adequate physical hygiene, so must it also develop mental hygiene, applying such knowledge as we now have in order to combat the mental and nervous disorders and diseases which, largely because of its rapid progress, it has fostered.

Psychology is a sort of super-physiology for, as physiology deals with the chemistry and functional activities of the various organs and groups of organs of the body, so psychology treats of the animal as a whole, with his actions and reactions toward his environment. In like manner, mental and physical hygiene may be considered as two parts of a general hygiene in which the former is the dominating factor; for, whereas the latter deals specifically with survival in terms of the

functional activity of the organs of the individual, mental hygiene deals with the sum total of these functions in relation to life, that is, with man's power as a whole individual to take his place constructively among his fellow creatures. These two parts are always interrelated, never independent, and are separated only by the specialization necessary for their application to the two aspects of individual activity. The care of the teeth, for example, requires a certain specific technical knowledge not found in mental hygiene which, in its turn, deals with man's health in terms unknown to its sister science. The rôle, then, of mental hygiene is to prevent those illnesses and miseries which arise from maladaptation as well as to readjust maladaptations which have already occurred. In other words, it deals with the practical application of psychology to the Art of Living.

Group life of the primitive sort appears to have been created as a biological necessity by the development of man's forebrain and to have grown gradually into the social structure

we now call civilization. To this, the individual man has to adjust himself both physically and mentally. Civilization is the product of the cumulative intelligence of the ages, the fruit of the wisdom of generations. Its progress has been marked by a growing necessity for coöperation and a relative decrease in competition, an increase in community of purpose, a less irregular and more powerful progress on the part of both individuals and groups of society toward the welfare of mankind as a whole. Progress from generation to generation, it seems, is marked in just this way, and what one generation contributes to the welfare of the next is the coefficient of that generation's immortality; as far as we *know*, it is in these terms and only in these terms that it lives beyond the span of its own physical life. This mental evolution seems to be accomplished by a process of experimenting, testing, and holding fast to that which is successful. The process apparently became less selective and more elastic as intelligence grew, finally eventuating in the ever more rational behaviour of man. Briefly, then, the story of civilization

from the point of view of mental development clearly seems to be the history of the evolution of intelligence, raising itself ever so slowly but nevertheless with biological certitude from a mere cunning to a progressively higher ethical plane.

From this standpoint, mental hygiene would be meaningless if disconnected from its ethical purpose. If happiness is a by-product following in the wake of successful adaptation, as experience teaches us it is, then the success in this process and consequently also the degree of happiness attained depends, in the last analysis, on just how much the individual has contributed and is contributing to the welfare of others. It has been my experience, furthermore, that happiness, besides being a joyous by-product of such success, is a very definite and reliable symptom of mental health. Pleasure, of course, is another matter.

Experience in teaching mental hygiene, however, has convinced me that this ethical aspect has suffered a relative neglect in many of the present methods of instruction. Very likely this

has been a necessary imperfection due to its youth as a science and the apparently pressing necessity, in each case, of applying a specific and detailed technique to overcome the immediate difficulty or disability presented by the case. However that may be, it seems to me that both teachers and pupils, doctors and patients, have paid relatively too much attention to the detail of reconstructive or preventive technique and too little to the main object of their efforts. Restoration of ability to serve, not relief of symptoms, when one thinks of it, is clearly the main objective of mental as well as physical hygiene. I have found, furthermore, in my own teaching, that, without this ethical objective, mental hygiene, as such, almost invariably fails even to cure symptoms.

// The many cases of so-called "nervous breakdown" with which I have come in contact have invariably proved to be due to some degree of maladaptation of the patient to his environment, meaning of course by this his social environment, and among these there have been a very great many where the maladaptation was clearly due

to a confusion in the patient's mind between means and ends, between technique and purpose, leading almost without exception to overvaluation of the means and undervaluation of the ends. As the objective so disastrously lost sight of in these cases is, in the last analysis, some phase of human relationship, and as the technique has proved inadequate almost always because of ignorance, I dare hope that to set forth what in my psychiatric experience has proved successful both in the way of technique and purpose may prove of service.

As the most practical approach to this subject I have chosen to deal in the following pages quite specifically with some of the most common human relationships, always considering success in these relationships as the object and mental hygiene merely as the means.

The subject from this standpoint naturally divides itself into two main parts: the first and larger, the aims and objectives to be attained, namely, the relationships themselves; and secondly, the chief means at present available of

obtaining or at least approaching a realization of these objectives, that is—practical mental hygiene. I mean, furthermore, to deal with the latter not from the highly detailed point of view of formal psychotherapy but from the simpler and more utilitarian standpoint of human engineering. In short, my ambition in writing this book is to make mental hygiene function as practical common sense applied to every-day life. It is in no sense a technical handbook either of psychology or even of mental hygiene.

A. F. R.

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INTRODUCTION

“FOR my generation,” writes Mr. H. G. Wells in his *Open Conspiracy*, “the rôle of John the Baptist must be our extreme ambition. . . . We have witnessed the apocalypse of the Great War; we have been misled, we have stumbled through depths of despair, we have learnt. . . . Here and there chance may correct and supplement the efforts of our race and save us from the full penalties of our mistakes and negligences, but saving the impact of some unimagined disaster from outer space, the ultimate decision of the fate of life upon this planet lies now in the will of man.”—And above all else in the will of man to know himself.

It is surprising how confused our understanding of human nature is. Let us not deceive ourselves in the belief that Science has yet overcome our deficiencies in this respect. Scientific efforts have struggled earnestly to make headway. Thus far they have received a mere pittance of support although we have been lavish enough in expend-

ing billions upon war and preparation for war. The aspirations of true human progress are clearly lacking in such a schedule of apportionment. With the tables reversed, with science militant, thoroughly supported, and productive, the house of Mars might find reasons to subsist on a pittance and, perhaps, to close its door permanently.

If such a programme were ever realized, progress might have a new opportunity. In any prospect of this kind the goal may seem Utopian. The price may be prohibitive and the time long in coming. Men would be called upon to think as they have never thought before. The undertaking could not fail to be a protracted labour. Because of the prejudices, traditions, misconceptions, apathies, and actual delusions of life which exist to-day, it would be a task not of one but of many generations. Sooner or later some generation will take up this work. Why not our own? Perhaps it is already begun. There are significant indications. There are even some insistent demands for action. All of these efforts fully deserve our attention. We should heed them particularly as they show how sorely we need a better understanding of ourselves. Only in a small way have we ventured to see how our own machine actually

works. Every other object has aroused our curiosity and stirred us to discovery. For the most part our own behaviour has been a thing apart, a matter of almost superstitious reverence. Yet we depend upon definite mechanisms for our intimate relations with a most material world. These relations are so closely interdependent that it is difficult to separate them one from another. Educational institutions still treat them quite casually, despite the fact that they are of utmost importance to each individual. Taking into account the growing number of maladjustments, of failures, and of misfits, we are certainly in need of special courses and special instruction to give us a proper conception of human relations. This is the practical side of the question. It has, however, intimate bearings on our problem of progress. Where, for example, do we or could we receive enlightenment as to the nature, duties, and responsibilities involved in the right conduct of such human relations as parenthood, citizenship, marriage, or friendship? We obtained the best we could get from the school of hard experience, from tradition and from the "mores" of our time and place. There is little promise of progressive advance in such casual educational methods. Under our present system it is not

surprising to find that maladjustments and failures in these relations are steadily on the increase. For our own greater contentment, if for nothing else, we need help.

The voice offering such help must be more than authoritative. It must bring conviction. It must stand the test of practical application. As the theory and practice of medicine are indispensable one to the other, so a valid theory of human relations must have justified itself in practice. Such is the authority which Dr. Riggs brings to us. He has a theory which stands the final test—it works. He has not merely formulated this theory, he has lived with and for it during many years. It is dynamic in his own experience; it has revitalized the lives of many who have come to him seeking aid.

One of the most prevalent causes of human inefficiency and frustration is that large group of disorders which for a long time have been included under the general heading of “nervous breakdown.” Dr. Riggs believes that many, if not the majority, of these maladies are due to some degree of maladjustment to the patient’s social environment. In substance, they result from confusion in understanding the proper objectives of human behaviour. His chief interest

centres upon the most common relationships of life. In these he finds the greatest danger for misunderstandings.

An incalculable loss to progress is attributed to the growing volume of maladjustment. This menace strikes an ominous and discouraging note for the future. It must be met and overcome if we hope to advance. We must recognize that racial success is a continuity from generation to generation. What one generation contributes to the welfare of the next is the only true index of its immortality.

There can be no doubt that Dr. Riggs is on firm ground in explaining the structural foundations underlying the processes of behaviour. He clearly indicates the manner in which the fore-brain has been employed and improved. He discloses important methods by which this guiding organ of the body may serve the purposes of adjustment and readjustment. He touches the keynote of this process in recognizing man's ability to control his inherent tendencies through intelligence, thus producing his great powers of adaptation.

Dr. Riggs is not merely one of the outstanding pioneers in an important field of thought and endeavour. He also is the leading teacher of those

principles which govern the balanced life. From him many have learned to discipline their lives anew. His doctrines have become an inspiration and a benefaction. This service is his preëminent contribution to his own day. He is likewise conspicuous in that leadership which is developing clearer vision, broader knowledge, and better control of human nature in all of its many relations.

FREDERICK TILNEY.

New York,

November 26, 1928.

INTELLIGENT LIVING

CHAPTER I

HUMAN RELATIONS

Fundamental Happiness Depends on Right Social Relationship—The Human Riddle of Adaptation—Our Personality as Raw Material—Man's Superior Ability

THERE is so much confusion caused by the unsettled state of psychological terminology that before going into the more interesting, vital side of our subject, the specific and personal applications of the principles of mental hygiene to human relations, it would be wise to define just what we mean by "adaptation," and in what sense we use such terms as "intelligence," "understanding," "choice," and "emotion." Furthermore, it would seem almost necessary here to deal, at least in a brief way, with the general principles of human adaptation from a more or less bird's-eye point of view, so that we may more surely maintain our orienta-

tion in our subject and so that when we come to personal and specific application we shall not be troubled by confusion either of terminology or theory. Therefore, I beg your undivided attention as I crave your indulgence for the following general considerations and definitions which, though very likely in themselves uninteresting, are I believe essential to a practical understanding. They shall be as brief as possible.

By human relationships, quite obviously, we do not mean simple physical relations in time and space, but rather a social relationship which is impossible to inanimate objects and at least improbable, except in its most elementary form, among the lower animals. The part of human relationship which interests us most, from which we derive our happiness or unhappiness and in which success or failure is the ultimate criterion of the worth of human life, is, however, not just social in the narrow sense of the word, for it does not depend upon custom, position, or classification in society as a political, economic, or social organization; it does not deal with legal rights, with the *quid pro quo* of fair exchange, or even with material success or failure, but with

certain essential and ethical values of our individual, purposive relation to others. Our fundamental happiness depends more, in other words, upon winning the love of our friends and upon deserving the approval of our community than upon amassing a fortune or defeating an enemy. But each human being is part not only of his own little group but also of the larger society called civilization, and is likewise responsible for its progress. His relationship to this progress, in terms of his purpose toward it, is man's greatest responsibility, chief source of satisfaction, and, at the same time, greatest difficulty.

Public health organizations, police and safety-first devices of all sorts make life from the physical standpoint almost too safe. Organized society takes such excellent care of its individuals from this point of view that man has little need of using his intelligence to protect his life from injury, starvation, or epidemics of disease. But just to be alive is not synonymous with being satisfied, nor is it tantamount to being happy. It would seem that civilization is the necessary product of the biological evolution of man, for

the inherent demand of each individual not only to live with his fellows but to be of importance among them was gradually transformed into the desire to be of use to his fellows and even to be remembered for the good he had done for others. This appears to be but the natural outcome of an ever more active intelligence worked upon and working upon the group life it has created. Man's demand for this specific form of happiness seems therefore to be a genuine biological development. Conversely, is it not indeed this very demand in each individual which makes civilization a biological necessity? At first, the instinct of self-protection underwent modification because man had to live in groups and the safety of the group had to replace survival of the individual, as the individual's objective. Simple society thus became a sort of mutual protective association. The antisocial individuals in any group were and still are the criminals, and were and still are treated as such—punished or destroyed. Each individual was classified according to his material value, protective or otherwise, to the group. There were masters and slaves, warriors, lawmakers, goods, cattle, and

women, and all these were the parts of an approved social arrangement.

As man's intelligence grew, as he began to get the benefit of the accumulated experience of generations through written language, not only did destructive competition within the group begin to give way to coöperative trade, but his own safety as well as that of the group became more sure, less a matter of continual thought and preparation; so that, within the group, as mere survival was sufficiently assured, the demand for a new and less material relationship naturally was born.

The helpless, the cripples, the old and worn out, the economically worthless were presumably no longer exterminated or left to starve. A sense of individual responsibility toward every other member developed, probably the expression of a strong instinctive force released by the absence of the necessity for self-protection, which grew as part of the progress of society toward civilization. This desire to protect, this responsibility for the welfare of the other fellow no doubt spread from its earlier application to the members of the individual's group exclusively,

until it included also those of other groups and finally, as an ethical idea, became all-embracing. The very soul of civilization, hardly appreciable at the dawn and now, though far from realization, more recognizable, is this purposive relation one to the other of the human beings of which it is composed. The paramount question now in any life is not: What are you doing, nor when, nor where, but *why*? Another proof that the ethical attitude is an inevitable biological result of the evolution of the race is the well-known fact that man is a planning animal. Now, clearly, a plan must have a purpose whether that plan be survival, material profit, pleasure, or the welfare of somebody else. This faculty of planning is an inherent, not an acquired, characteristic, but its objective has changed as man has developed. As his power of understanding has increased it has of necessity chosen more and more useful and appropriate purposes or, in other words, more intelligent purposes, the most intelligent yet reached being ethical, i. e.—the welfare of his group, his nation, or his kind. To realize the objective of survival or of profit is a relatively easy job requiring little intelligence. To

realize the purpose of serving another's welfare and of adding to civilization in such terms is by far the harder job, for it takes much more intelligence and has more and greater obstacles to overcome, especially those presented by the individual's own instinctive counter demands.

It is in clearly defining this purpose and planning for its realization, as well as in carrying out the plan when once made, that so many of us fail, that so many of us fall by the wayside. We fail because we do not think, because we do not recognize this or that relationship as a specific and purposive problem of our own. We miss the challenge and feel it merely in terms of the pain or pleasure it engenders. On the other hand, to define this purpose, to see it clearly and to adopt it as the goal of our efforts is the first step toward successful adaptation to our world. To state our purpose toward this or that situation constitutes the first step necessary in solving the equation of our adaptation to it.

Very broadly speaking, the problem of human adaptation consists, then, in fitting dynamically, not passively, into an environment made up of other similar individuals, singly and organized

into all sorts of groups, political, economic, social, and vocational, a stratified and cross-stratified mass of lives. This environmental mass demands of its individuals a certain sort of adaptation. It offers reasonable personal safety to the individual, is organized to take care of him mechanically and physically and, in this way, substitutes social devices which function in place of his own protective instincts. Likewise, through economic organization, the individual is asked to specialize his efforts, to make his contributions to the whole of one specific kind and for the most part *only* of one kind, his other possible activities and needs being contributed by other specialized groups. Even his individual emotional demands are to be regularized, disciplined to run only in certain channels which shall at least not be harmful even if not directly useful to the group. Not only is he confronted by this mass of lives, as a mass, but he is also confronted by single individual lives with their needs and demands, with the necessity of understanding them, with the need to share their opportunities, their pleasures, their pains, their happiness, their sorrow; in short, to

live with them physically, emotionally, and mentally.

Even without machinery, rapid transit, and other time- and space- annihilating inventions, what a complex and impossibly difficult environment it would be for an uneducated, inexperienced, but full-grown man! And yet, every babe to-day is born to face this problem and is supposed to solve it by hook or by crook, in the short time between birth and maturity, with only such aids to adaptation as we can give him. He has not only the physiological development to go through—of course, this is taken care of and fairly effectively by the parental and medical members of his environment—but he has the individual problem of learning the significance of his relation with all these other lives; he has the task of developing the ability to find his place and to take it in all this complexity. And with this part of his problem he gets but indifferent help at present, for it is not till quite late in his training, if ever, that he is *taught to think*.

The two sides of the equation in this human riddle of adaptation are: (1) the powers, latent

and developed, inherent in the individual, the raw materials, as it were, on the one side; and (2) that to which he has to adapt himself, his environment, on the other.

The first component of this equation might be designated "Individuality."

Individuality depends, in the first place, on the physiological constitution. Man differs from other animals not only in his bony conformation, his musculature, and the shape, size, and position of his organs, but, also and chiefly, in the structure and functional activity of his nervous system. Indeed, from this point of view, he resembles the higher apes far more closely in size and appearance than he does in thought and action, for upon his nervous system, especially upon the relatively greater activity both quantitative and qualitative of that part of it known as the forebrain, is based his greatly superior adaptive ability.

This nervous system so integrates all of his bodily functions that his adjustment to changes of environment or, more simply, his response to external stimulus, tends to follow certain fixed,

one may say racial, patterns. These patterns, however, are subject to wide variation through the modifying action of his forebrain. His first response to any perceived change in his surroundings is physiological. For instance, he hears a loud, unexpected sound; immediately, because of his inherent physiological constitution, he gives an involuntary start. This is an obvious and common phenomenon, but far more important and far less obvious is what happens inside of him. His whole vegetative life has undergone a sudden and very marked transformation. His blood pressure, blood chemistry, rapidity and distribution of circulation, the chemical and muscular activities of his gastro-intestinal tract as well as his voluntary musculature have all undergone marked quantitative and qualitative changes. These changes he is fortunately not aware of, as such, but he feels a difference in the accustomed sensations arising in many if not all of his vegetative functions. The part of these changes of which he is at the time aware we call *emotion*, and it is always to some extent either painful or pleasurable. This pain or pleasure element is very important because it acts as a

strong motivating force to avoid the pain or welcome the pleasure. Thus, this internal mobilization of energy called emotion is not just painful or pleasurable but carries with it a very definite and insistent urge to specific action. This is readily observable and particularly clear in all of the so-called primitive emotions. For instance, the man afraid is impelled to run away from the source of his fear; the man in whom anger has been aroused is, by that very condition, urged to attack or destroy the object of his anger.

The first reaction of any human being to any perceived change is, then, a purely mechanical, physiological one, consisting of a sudden mobilization of energy which he feels as emotion and which he tends to express in typical but not necessarily socially appropriate action. Thus far the forebrain has played no part in the action, and man has reacted internally, felt, and desired to act just like any other animal of approximately his position in the scale of evolution.

But now, just before overt action takes place, comes the opportunity of the forebrain to function. Before action comes the moment for thought, or, better, for understanding. Here

man differs from all other animals, for he has a forebrain which endows him with the ability to comprehend the significance of what he has reacted to, to understand his relation to the object which has aroused his emotions. Furthermore, this ability to understand carries with it a certain executive power which we commonly call choice, and he is thus enabled to select, from among all the various modes of response which his understanding pictures as possible, that particular one which appears most desirable, most appropriate, or most effective. Thus, though the physiological mobilization be that of fear, though he may feel a painfully strong urge to fly, yet, if in the moment for thought vouchsafed him he understands that the noise, no matter how loud, is *not* significant of danger, he settles down again to his task. If, however, in that moment of understanding he realizes that, although the noise may be significant of actual danger, the desired objective requires him to face it, he is then free to choose not only among all the presenting alternative paths of escape but between all escape on the one hand and continuing his pursuit of some precious or merely approved purpose

on the other. If he so chooses, he has exercised the privilege, unique to mankind, of using emotional energies, no matter what their specific nature, no matter how intense, according to his understanding and volition. Instinctive reaction has then become intelligent conduct. In this ability to modify his inherent tendencies we find the true measure of man's great power of adaptation.

It is, however, only in *how* he uses these automatically mobilized energies, these emotions of his, that man is ethical or non-ethical. Human emotions in themselves are no more moral or immoral than similar emotions in any other animal. Anger is no more wicked than love is virtuous, for both are basically merely physiological reflexes and, therefore, no more to be dealt with morally than are coughs and sneezes. There are, nevertheless, those who still attempt to give primitive emotions definite places in the ethical scale. To do so, however, is merely constrictive thinking. It is true that often a primitive emotion runs parallel with the highest purpose and may then be freely and constructively expressed. Intention and purpose are the moral

elements, but we are responsible for the *use* of all our energies, including our emotions, whether anger, fear, or love, in the service of our approved purposes and according to our common sense. Our responsibility and, therefore, the whole question of ethics begin and end there and have nothing whatever to do with the raw material (emotion) which happens to be on hand. Emotion is, of course, essential to any action. Once placed in a chair, without emotion we would never move again. Emotion supplies not only the initiative to action but also the punch for carrying it out; emotion is the fire under the boiler without which the dynamics of the whole mechanism could not move and, like the fire, it is neither ethical nor unethical, but non-ethical—just fire.

Different individuals of the same species vary as to their adaptability, but in no species is this individual variation greater than in man. Lower animals of the same species vary more in size and weight than in their individual abilities to adapt. Two salmon are far more similar in this way than are two dogs, but it is not until we get to the primates that this individual variation

becomes sharply remarkable and, among the primates, it is only in man that it goes to such extraordinary lengths as to attain transcendent importance. The problem of adaptation in man is, indeed, always an individual and an individualistic one, for men vary greatly not only in their inherent individualities but also in the effect that their greatly varying social environment has had upon that original endowment. And because the social environment is made up of other similarly varying lives, understanding of the problem centres about, if it does not wholly consist in, the study of individuality, as such, particularly in terms of the factors which chiefly constitute the variables in its equation.

First among these variables comes "temperament." This term is used very loosely in conversation and also in popular literature. It is used to cover meanings ranging widely from an attribute of genius to the possession of a bad temper. I am here using the word in the sharply restricted sense of *sensitiveness*. William James said many years ago that the world was made up of the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded." According to our meaning of temperament we could

paraphrase this statement by saying that the world is composed of two sorts of people, the sensitive and the insensitive, or the temperamental and the untemperamental. Of course such a sweeping and ungraded distinction is far too general to be of practical use, nor does it fit the facts, for, as a matter of fact, individuals vary in their temperaments in every conceivable degree from apparently utter insensitiveness to extraordinary hypersensitiveness. Furthermore, not only do people vary in the degree of their sensitiveness, but also and very widely according to its specific nature. In general, sensitiveness in all cases is to the pain-pleasure quality of emotion; that is, hypersensitive people tend to react more profoundly and acutely to that which would be painful or pleasurable to anyone. In other words, an emotion aroused in the hypersensitive person would constitute a greater, more acute, and more painful physiological reaction and would supply him with a stronger and more insistent urge to action than in the case of a person moderately sensitive or insensitive.

Such a variation could still be only a matter of degree were it not for the fact that people also

vary in another way and that this other way at once makes the general sensitiveness a completely specific and individualistic quality. I refer here to what for lack of a better term we may call "personality." By this term we mean the sum total of the so-called "instinctive" or inherent emotional tendencies to react to stimuli. For instance in a person, though possessing of course both timidity and pugnacity, one or the other quality is always dominant to some degree or other and, consequently, we speak of him as pugnacious or timid according to which of these qualities predominates. Similarly, when people's personalities are marked by other predominating instinctive qualities, we name the *whole* personality by the typifying tendency. Thus, for instance, we speak of an aggressive or a retiring, a paternal (or maternal), a curious or incurious personality. Now it is obvious that a timid person will experience more fear than a markedly pugnacious individual; likewise, that a curious person will be more affected by curiosity, an aggressive one by strong positive self-feeling, and so forth. It is perhaps equally obvious that, in each case, whatever sensitiveness there may

be will be specifically and especially toward the inherently predominant emotion. The sensitiveness will, furthermore, include not only the tendency to physiological overreaction and sensitiveness to the pain-pleasure element of the emotion, but also a more or less marked tendency to yield to its urge for specific expression. Thus, a person of timid personality and hypersensitive temperament will not only suffer more from the physiological disturbances of fear and will be oversensitive to its painfulness, but will experience a stronger desire to escape, to run away from the object of that fear.

Were temperament and inherent personality the only important elements in individuality, then human adaptation would never rise above the instinctive level, and it would be comparatively easy to recognize variants in the species simply by observing their reactions to environmental situations. Each individual would exhibit his own fixed characteristics and would always and invariably react according to these. Fortunately or unfortunately, this obviously is not the case, for another great factor, the greatest from the adaptive point of view, comes into

play. This factor is intelligence, and it changes the whole picture of man's adaptation and makes it very dissimilar to that of any other animal.

Just what intelligence is we really do not know. We borrow the word from common parlance where, like temperament, it has acquired many and somewhat contradictory meanings, and we give it a restricted and, as far as we can, a definite connotation. We know that it is at least very largely, if not exclusively, a function of the forebrain and that it includes two main offices, "understanding" and "choice." For our present purpose, it may be termed the power to comprehend the relationship of things and events to one another and, particularly, one's own relation to that which has been observed. In short, intelligence is the ability to understand the relation of self to environment, as well as the relation of different parts of the environment to each other. The second function, choice, is hardly separable from the first but is, nevertheless, at least a distinct part of it. No matter, for the moment, whether there be such a thing as free will—let the metaphysicians continue to quarrel over this, their own particular bone of contention—and in

spite of the good old-fashioned idea of will as a moral quality, a sort of muscular virtue, let us consider choice as a purely mechanical sort of end reaction or function of intelligence, as merely the executive functioning of understanding through the expressor mechanism of the nervous system.

Thus understanding and choice make adaptation on a much more versatile process, for they make it possible to learn from experience and on this basis also to predict and more or less prepare for the future. The first emotional reaction to environmental change remains, of course, the same, but the ability to understand the significance of that change, to compare it with similar changes and also, from experience, to envisage several possible responses including their probable effects, not only enables him to modify what otherwise would be merely raw instinctive reaction, but it also spells man's extraordinary educability and thus gives him the power to adapt himself to a greater variety of conditions than any other animal and enables him to make his adaptations progressively more successful.

Coming into the civilized world a naked animal with this very sensitively responsive emotional outfit and endowed also with great potential intelligence, the baby begins at once to be acted upon by its environment. It responds with what, compared to the rest of the animal world, is an extraordinary educability and passes fairly rapidly through various stages of development which are curiously like those its race has passed through. Born a more or less parasitic and distinctly helpless animal, it passes, by virtue of training, example, and suggestion more than because of education, from mere animalhood through savagery and barbarism to primitive and, finally, to advanced civilization. It passes through one level of adaptation to another. At first adaptation is on a simple, instinctive plane motivated by pain and pleasure and determined only by its instinctive make-up. Then the social plane is reached where understanding so modifies the instinctive reactions as to make them more profitable responses. Finally, the ethical plane is achieved where understanding has adopted the welfare of others as the most satisfying ob-

jective, and ways and means are chosen according to this purpose. This last stage is clearly the most difficult of achievement, for it presupposes not only understanding of the highest order but a severe modification of some of the strongest inherent, instinctive urges of self. One of these urges, however, is fortunately particularly amenable to training and can be relied on to furnish us with plenty of emotional warmth and energy to make ethical life not only possible to us but highly desirable. I refer to the strong desire, recognizable in each one of us, to be important, not just to be important in general but to be important specifically to the lives with which we come in contact. It is really merely a question of choosing how we are to be important. If we do not choose intelligently we may find ourselves of importance only in terms of being a nuisance or of drawing momentary attention to ourselves by being bizarre, or because of the big noise we make. If, however, we choose wisely, we choose usefulness as the most satisfactory method of importance and, if we so choose, we are at least headed toward the ethical plane. Realization

of the ethical objective is, of course, never complete, and its criterion of success must always be relative progress, the progress of an instinctive though intelligent animal toward the goal of civilized citizenship.

I have touched briefly on the source of man's superior adaptive ability, namely, the structure and functional activity of his nervous system and particularly that part of it known as the forebrain.

Man's forebrain is much larger and of far greater activity, in relation to the other parts of his brain and nervous system, than is the case with any other member of the animal kingdom. This fact is correlated with another, namely, that his powers of adaptation to environment are likewise greater than those of other animals whose adaptations are made largely by virtue of their midbrain, hindbrain, and spinal cord, the functional result being chiefly that they survive and procreate their kind. Indeed, throughout the evolutionary scale the relative size of the forebrain is the anatomical measure, as the adaptability to change in environment is

the functional measure, of any animal's place in evolutionary progress.

The function of the forebrain is largely that of adaptation, not of one part of the body to another but of the whole animal, in terms of its life activities, to changes in its environment. Couple this with another well-known fact, that the forebrain is the organ of intelligence, and we have a scientifically secure basis for characterizing man specifically as *homo sapiens*, the intelligent animal, and, furthermore, of describing this intelligence as exhibiting its chief function in terms of adaptability.

It is at least probable that the first result of man's more powerful forebrain or, in other words, of his greater intelligence was to cause him to survive in greater numbers for, being enabled to adapt himself successfully to a greater variety of conditions in his environment, a larger number of those formerly fatal to his life would have become innocuous. Obviously, then, one of the first results of the domination of his intelligence would have been the creation of a new condition in his environment, namely, a greater number of his own species, and, consequently, he faced

the necessity of adapting himself not only to greater and greater numbers of his own kind but to larger and larger groups.

Not only did his intelligence enable him to survive in greater numbers, but his instinctive nature endowed him also with a *desire* to live with and among his fellows, a desire which seems always to have been, and obviously still is, an inherent emotional necessity. It is an old saying that "Nature abhors a vacuum"; no less does man abhor loneliness. One of the worst punishments that can be inflicted, one of the most destructive and inhuman, is solitary confinement, combining as it does, at one blow, complete frustration of two of man's strongest and most insistent emotional demands—liberty and companionship. Is not this demand for his kind with which each normal individual of the species is so strongly endowed the inherent biological basis of civilization? In other words, is it not this emotional energy insistent seeking expression in each individual that was and is chiefly responsible for men drawing together? Is it not this strong tendency in each normal individual that is

the biological cause of group life and, therefore, the biological basis of civilization?

At all events, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that, given this new problem, his intelligence rose to the occasion and created some primitive plan of group life, the size and kind of group being very likely determined at least to a large extent by the necessities of the physical environment. By accepting some such beginning in group life it would seem that the multiplication of his species must have gone on in certain regions of the earth with marked rapidity and that, consequently, the size and type of group which his increasing numbers demanded would have developed from the simple to the complex, from animal life to savagery, through barbarism and on up to civilization. Thus man's intelligence had to develop greater functional power as the very condition it had created, namely, his social environment, made greater demands upon it. Man, therefore, is not only the intelligent animal but is also the social animal, and his social qualities and the society he has created are as much biological products, one as the other.

It is nonsense to think of nature as apart from man, let alone as opposed to him and, therefore, absurd to conceive of man as above nature, as unlike other animals, and as independent of the laws of evolution which have governed their development.

We have long been satisfied to explain the coöperation and social activities of a colony of ants and the architectural accomplishments of the mason bees as due to their inherent, instinctive constitutions. It is only our natural conceit and some unimportant traditional beliefs that have made it at all difficult for us to realize, with equal clearness, that man's biological constitution has similarly supplied him both with the desire to live with his fellow man and the ability and desire to evolve a more and more successful social structure. This constitution of his not only causes him to struggle to attain but to find satisfaction in the striving itself, as well as in the attainment. Ethical strivings, ideals, and the resultant progress in civilization are just as clearly evolutionary products as are the tropisms and consequent activities of insects, our ancient prejudices to the contrary notwithstanding.

They have, furthermore, another characteristic in common with tropisms, namely, they are absolutely essential to man's individual survival in the complex environment—civilization which he has created—as well as being necessary to the continued evolution of the race in that civilization.

CHAPTER II

WRONG ADJUSTMENT

*The Causes of Failure—How We Express
Our Mistakes—Escape Under False Labels—
Guiding Our Emotions*

ADAPTATION being the process of fitting one's self to one's environment, we are obviously interested in our present survey in that aspect of this process which has to do with the social environment, namely, with what one might call "coöperative social adaptation." Failure in this process, to whatever degree, we call maladaptation, and just as the criterion of success in adaptation is the satisfaction of others as well as self, so the outcome of maladaptation is dissatisfaction of self as well as others.

The causes of failure are manifold but can, nevertheless, be roughly divided into two classes: first, those arising in self; and second, those

found in the environment. Among the latter, front rank should be given to ignorance and misinformation resulting from negatively poor or positively harmful education. Of equal importance is bad example derived from the family or even from the larger community group. These environmental causes will be considered in the chapters on "The Child" and "Training and Education," and so may be dismissed for the moment. The causes to be found in self are, however, of immediate interest. The main ones in this class seem to be, first, inadequate intelligence. This inadequacy may be either fundamental and inherent, namely, some degree of feeble-mindedness, or it may be solely functional, that is, inadequacy of a normal mind which is merely misinformed or ignorant; secondly, some overstrong or untrained instinctive trend may be the basic cause of maladaptation or, the exact opposite, an underdeveloped, relatively weak instinct may by its very weakness make adaptation particularly difficult. Lastly, and very frequently, the instinctive personality may be well balanced and completely normal and the intelligence basically normal as

well, and still, mismanagement of the former simply through lack of specific knowledge will produce maladaptation of the so-called neurotic type. In short, failure in coöperative adaptation occurs whenever there is a relative inadequacy of intelligent control of the inherent forces, as well as when those inherent forces are themselves supernormal or subnormal. The resultant maladaptation takes several recognizable and already classified forms. The most prominent of these is labelled "criminal." Society wages a constant and none too intelligent war on criminals and has only recently come to know that a very large percentage of such individuals are either feeble-minded or psychopathic, that is, fundamentally inadequate. Most of these are suffering either from disease or congenital inadequacy.

A less violent contrast to the good citizen is to be found among the mildly antisocial, the cranks who are forever "agin the government," who are rarely "pro" anything but always "anti" something. They, for the most part, are failures because they are congenitally unable to succeed along the highways of life, and find their

only chance of importance in some form of mild rebellion against the world as it is.

An even less violent type of maladaptation is the asocial individual. He is negatively an "anti" but not even positive enough to vote that way. He often has an undue feeling of inferiority and suffers from a fundamental timidity, or is definitely lacking in herd instinct. His adaptation is avoidance not only of conflict but of responsibility. He gets protection from society but neither values it nor feels himself called upon to pay for it in loyalty or service. There are, of course, all degrees of these types of maladaptation, yielding anything from mere mediocrity to complete social failure. It is not within the scope of this work to deal with criminology or psychopathology; so, in our present study, we must exclude all those forms of maladaptation arising from inherent inadequacy of either the emotional or mental endowment and confine ourselves to that of the completely normal.

The mechanisms involved in this commonest of all forms of maladjustment are precisely the same as those that operate in the most suc-

cessful adaptation; as far as the individuality is concerned, the instinctive outfit contains exactly the same elements; the intelligence is quite normal, often of the highest grade and, when it comes to environment, rarely can this properly be blamed for the failure. Indeed, nothing is added to nor is there anything missing from the equation which should yield adaptation, and yet, because of an internal disharmony in the individuality itself, some degree of failure results. It is a curious fact that the very characteristics which are obviously the most precious assets of the greatest lives we know constitute in themselves the liability to neurotic maladaptation. We could hardly imagine a Christ or a Lincoln without exquisite sensitiveness as well as a high order of intelligence. Yet it is these very qualities, when wrongly valued, misunderstood, badly managed, or wrongly combined, that are to blame for the vast majority of failures in adaptation to civilized life.

Failure may express itself in a great variety of ways, ranging from mere mild dissatisfaction to the complete temporary breakdown of a severe neurosis. Never, however, to my

knowledge, can the most severe functional breakdown produce a mental disease. If there already exists an underlying predisposition to mental disease, that is, if the disease is already existent though not manifest, an otherwise purely functional breakdown, no doubt, might force this predisposition into manifest activity. On the other hand, the functional form of breakdown is the typical response of a very normal person, of one, furthermore, who possesses to a high degree those very qualities of sensitiveness and intelligence which are in themselves so valuable when rightly used in the difficult problems and demands of civilization. The people of this world who are most apt to maladapt are potentially and often actually its most valuable citizens. They are really the checked and obstructed fellows of the great and heroic, having the same qualities in common with these immortals and like them always sensitive, often exquisitely so, and intelligent. The great and successful, by hook or by crook or by the grace of God, as you choose, have succeeded in harnessing their sensitiveness to great and simple purposes; they have succeeded in making this sensitiveness a

servant and ally of their intelligence. Some few have learned this through the bitter experiences of a breakdown and have, through the knowledge thus hardly won, joined the ranks of their similarly constituted but more fortunate brethren—the successful. These two qualities of greatness, sensitiveness and intelligence, may be said to tend strongly toward a partnership. Where sensitiveness is the senior partner and dominates the intelligence, it leads directly and inevitably to maladaptation. On the other hand, adaptation demands that the relative position of the partners be reversed. Intelligence must be enthroned as the head of the firm, the dictator; and sensitiveness, not as a slave but as the contributing and invaluable junior, always except in playtime under orders. This form of partnership becomes, fortunately, quite as habitual as the other, though it can never be trusted to operate automatically.

Adaptation is never a static condition; on the contrary, it is a progress and requires continual effort, continual recrystallization and redefining of its purposes, continual improvement in technique. It is always dealing with the natural

tendency, inherent in all of us, to cease striving for the distant objective and yield to the often insistent counterdemands of our instinctive natures. A new difficulty may so easily arouse enough discouragement, an illness sufficient discomfort and depression to discount intelligence and give sensitiveness a seemingly irrefutable argument for self-indulgent retirement from the struggle. It is at such times that sensitiveness tries hard to assume its old and natural rôle of liability and lead its possessor into the paths of neurotic maladjustment.

The mechanism of this sort of maladaptation is often very simple at bottom. The instinct of escape, that negative side of the instinct of self-protection, has its way. Intelligence so easily joins the conspiracy against progressive, purposive adaptation by lending its powers of rationalization to rebellion or escape. It makes retirement seem plausible. It furnishes good reasons, not really good but well-appearing and high-sounding ones, why the easier paths are the best. It makes retreat seem not only justifiable or expedient but possibly even noble. Often it borrows strength from religious sources and can

with this help make cowardice appear admirable, as self-sacrifice. It can make the insistent demand for safety and non-responsibility which arises from oversensitiveness and timidity seem an admirable thing by taking cover under a religious formula such as "It is God's will." Thus, all too easily, a useful and responsible citizen may escape into the more or less complete protective isolation of the *vita monastica*.

Often the mechanism of escape works its way through the mere misinterpretation of normal emotional activities. The physiological concomitants of emotion, especially those of fear, may be mistaken for symptoms of impending or actual disease, or the emotions themselves, though recognized as such, may be falsely valued according to some ancient moral category. I have often found otherwise informed and certainly intelligent people struggling hopelessly under the false belief that some emotions are "bad" and others "good"; for instance, that anger is "wicked," fear "cowardly," and passion "indecent." Such beliefs are manifestly absurd. As well might we divide the body into

moral and immoral zones, as well consider our eyes virtuous and our feet wicked, our stomachs good and our thyroids bad, as to label our emotions which we know to be primarily physiological reactions either good or bad, virtuous or wicked. Moreover, such a belief lays its possessor under the necessity of either acknowledging himself hopelessly wicked and unfit, of struggling to extirpate something in himself which is an essential and normal part of himself and cannot be destroyed, or of making believe that it does not exist and thus forcing it to express itself in vicarious, abnormal, and altogether undesirable ways.

Thus occur a thousand and one forms of intellectualized rebellion against the environment in which, again, intelligence becomes the servant of the instinctive self and presents it with acceptable reasons: if it is fear, for escape; if it is sex desire, for sexual indulgence; if it is self-importance, for expression in forms untrammelled by competition, and, whether the net result is *vers libre* without form, grace, rhythm, or sense, art without technique or purpose, parlour

Bolshevism or free love, it spells maladaptation, always the certain result of sensitiveness being the dictator and reason the slave.

Fortunately, all cases of this sort of failure are curable and, better, they are preventable; for, as one can easily see, in their very nature they are based on ignorance, and only adequate knowledge is necessary, therefore, either to cure or to prevent.

Human adaptation, then, is in contrast to that of the lower animals which rarely arises above self-protection and procreation, because it depends on purpose, and to be successful in this adaptation each individual must be more or less definitely aware of his purpose. In short, it is a purposive process, not just a mechanical and passive fitting into things as they are. Indeed, to the individual the challenge of any situation is primarily to his intelligence, and this can only be met adequately by first formulating his relation to the situation in terms of his purpose and then finding appropriate means for the realization of this purpose. The raw material with which he has to work is the mass, so to speak, of his

inherent tendencies or, in other words, his emotional nature. There are two components of the problem which challenge his power of understanding: the first is this personality of his with its instinctive forces, its temperament, presided over more or less by his intelligence; the second the environmental situation of which he among others is a part.

It is clear, then, that the process of adaptation is, or should be, very largely a matter of skill, the skilful guidance of strong emotional forces. The goal of the game is, or should be, usefulness, contribution to the other lives involved. Success in the game is progress toward this goal and depends not just on good will alone but chiefly and fundamentally upon understanding the game, its purpose, and the players. Experience, it is said, teaches the wise. It would perhaps be more accurate to say that experience forges wisdom of intelligence. Certainly it is true that experience is an invaluable teacher of the art of adaptation. But the trial and error of experience must have purpose in it or it is mere haphazard experimenting. By this method we first learn what responses avoid or produce pain or pleasure.

Farther along the road we learn which paths lead to profit and which to loss; while still farther, this time much farther in our progress from animalhood to citizenship, we begin to discern that happiness and unhappiness are by-products, the one of poor, the other of successful, adaptation to the purposive game of life.

Experience itself is a slow even if thorough teacher, and much time may be saved by education, which, after all, is only experience guided and set by the wiser and older for the younger and less experienced. Education should help not only by increasing the individual's fund of information but by increasing his ability to understand himself and his environment. In early life education by suggestion, example, and stimulating emulation, rather than through didactic methods, should build up a set of strong, useful sentiments. By "useful sentiments" I mean ideas of strong feeling tone which not only envisage but also supply us with a desire for and an admiration of ethical principles, purposes, and attitudes.

From these, the citizen-in-the-making derives his practical ideals—that is, ideals which are not

mere notions of perfection but clear, practical, and purposive ideas, strongly motivated by warm emotion. Thus, in contrast to troublesome jealousy and useless self-pity, which conspire against the ideal of service, useful sentiments such as loyalty, honour, fair play, and good sportsmanship make a strong and reliable bodyguard for it. The realization of this ideal, or rather, progress toward its realization in action and, furthermore, the struggle for attainment itself yield that joyous mental contentment which we call happiness and which we therefore can also consider a reliable criterion of successful adaptation. In other words, not mere survival, but success in his human relationships is the goal of man's striving. Not only is this goal the goal of his happiness, but the very striving toward it is at once a great biological necessity and the source of much of this happiness. Inner harmony is the result, not the cause, of successful social adaptation, and the latter depends primarily on understanding others as well as self and, furthermore, of accepting one's self as well as others.

CHAPTER III

FRIENDSHIP

Understanding as the First Element of Friendship—Balance of Give and Take—An Ideal Picture of Devotion—The Dangers of Jealousy

HAVING surveyed Adaptation from the more or less impersonal and general points of view, we are at last ready to apply our terminology and theories to our specific problem—Human Relations.

The first specific relation I have in mind is Friendship, for it seems to me that this is a prototype of what all human relations might or perhaps should in some degree be.

Just what do you and I mean by friendship? It is certainly an emotional attachment, that is, we first and foremost like those whom we call friends. There is a somewhat cynical saying that "God gives us our relations but, thank God, we can choose our friends." Is that really true? Do

we go about with a set of preconceived specifications looking for a person or persons possessing the qualities specified? Do we make friends in any such way? Do we look for someone about so tall, so thin, or so fat, with blue eyes or black, interested in literature or music or outdoors, athletic or non-athletic, of a certain temperament or of a certain age, and then, finding our specifications satisfied, do we deliberately choose the fortunate candidate as friend? It seems to me that the actual process of making friends begins and ends on far different lines, that it is neither deliberate nor planned, nor has it, at least in the making, much if anything to do with choice.

How did you "make" your best friend? Was it not largely due in the first place to happy and unforeseen circumstances? You were perhaps in a room full of people, you were drawn more particularly to that person, you simply liked him or her, were interested, sympathetically interested, and—friendship began. Like every other human reaction to environment, yours was an inadvertent expression of your inherent emotional nature to an adequate stimulus. Your first response, the thing which first happened,

merely *happened*—and it was emotional. The desire to be of importance to that particular person, unformulated, no doubt, and only formlessly felt, made a partnership with your intelligence and, borrowing some strength from curiosity, expressed itself as a desire to understand the other person. Is not this the first element of friendship—sympathetic understanding? The desire to understand, supplied by the emotional reaction, gives us the sympathy for understanding, while our intelligence gives us the required ability to realize the wish; just as the desire to be of importance to that other life comes from our inherent instinctive make-up, while the power to choose the means of being important lies in our intelligence. The partnership between emotion and intelligence is completed when our affections motivate our understanding and the latter takes up the then welcome burden of responsibility by wisely choosing the most effective, the most satisfactory way of being of importance to the life of the new-found friend. When contribution to the other's welfare and happiness is chosen to be the objective, then friendship has not only begun but *is*. Can we not therefore accept sympa-

thetic understanding and contribution, the former guiding the latter, as the two essential elements in all friendship?—for thus service becomes the kinetic expression of love, and happiness the by-product of successful service.

That the other fellow should feel, think, and act likewise is, of course, a very important though not absolutely essential part of the picture. My friend may go back on me, and that would be most unfortunate, probably also most painful, but I need not therefore go back on him. If, on the other hand, the basis of friendship began and ended on the emotional plane of mere like and dislike; if, in short, the relationship lacked purpose even though it might include some little understanding; if my friend ever displeased me—let alone went back on me in terms of disloyalty—then the friendship, being dependent only on emotion, would forthwith cease. In that case one could hardly speak of a “broken friendship,” for the relationship being purely emotional would have been too evanescent, too weak an affair to be considered breakable, a mere sentimentality without purpose or responsibility.

The ideal of friendship is, of course, that it shall be a fully mutual relation, but like most ideals worthy of the name it is not attainable, only approachable. In striving toward it, however, each one must stick closely to his own responsibility and function and must not assume that of the other. It is up to me to keep my own purpose clear and not in any way my business to formulate my friend's for him. It is up to you to strain your intelligence to understand the other fellow's needs and life, and not at all your business to insist that he should understand your needs. Whenever, of two friends, one strives overhard to make the other understand him, that other one is all too likely to respond only in kind and in his turn make it his exclusive business to make himself understood. Indeed, after a time he does not even listen to what the other is saying—merely waits for him to stop talking so that he himself can take up the cudgels of self-explanation on his own behalf. It is amusing how readily we assume our own understanding of the other fellow and how sure we are that his reading of us is markedly defective. Perhaps this is an unrecognized method we have of avoiding the chal-

lenge to our intelligence presented by the problem of the other's life. Perhaps it functions as an alibi for what we fear may be true, namely, that we ourselves will fail or have failed to understand. Is not the misunderstood person often less misunderstood than misunderstanding?

At all events, competitive self-explanation, I am sure, rarely results in anything but controversy or stalemate and cannot be recommended as a method of welding relationships.

On the other hand, if each individual assumes, as his sole responsibility, his own purpose toward the other, and, furthermore, devotes himself to trying always to understand the other, he will find, I am sure, that he has undertaken a purposive job which will keep his intelligence fully occupied, so fully indeed that there will be little opportunity or desire left for self-explanation, so little that he is not only perforce but rather gladly willing to leave his friend's understanding of him, his attitude toward him, and his efforts for him entirely to his friend.

A friendly competition in understanding one another and in contributing toward one another according to that understanding seems, in con-

trast to competitive self-explanation, the very purpose and method which is friendship.

Of course, understanding the other fellow is not just understanding what is included within the boundaries of his skin—that would be hard enough—but friendship demands an understanding not only of his immediate emotional demands but of his life as a whole, which means, especially, his life in relation to other lives; in short, his interests, his responsibilities, his abilities, and above all his purposes and ideals. It is his citizenship, his contribution to others, the purposive meaning of his life, both the quality and potentiality of it and not just the accomplished actuality, with which we are in partnership and to which our best contributions can be made. For is it not the ideal we hold of our friend, the person he is in-the-making, the person we expect him to be, that constitutes our fundamental interest and the immortal object of our affections? To realize fully the importance in friendship of what might be called this practical idealizing of the friend, you only have to change places with him and think what the expectation

of your friend, what *his* idealizing of *you* has meant to you.

There are two very different ways of responding to the high opinion and faith of one's friends. The self-protective and timid person tends to react to it by giving way to a strong desire to escape failure, to avoid falling short of expectation. He is apt to rationalize this fear by explaining with a modesty which is genuine at least in its timidity that he is but a "whited sepulchre," that he cannot bear to "sail under false colours" and must, therefore, make it clear that this friend's good opinion is far too high, that he must not expect much or indeed anything of him, for he is only a very ordinary, rather handicapped individual. This attitude of "the pride that apes humility," thus rationalized, functions at once as an escape from responsibility and as a preparation both for the prepardoned failure or the possible success. Should the latter be achieved the credit would then be highly magnified. This method not only fails to contribute anything to friendship but defeats even its own poor purpose of self-defence, because the pro-

testations of inability and unworthiness are regularly discounted as arising from undue modesty or even as signs of illness or ill mood, and the loyal faith and great expectations of the timid one's friends continue to stand as firmly as ever, nay, even more firmly, for have they not been strengthened by the discovery of a new virtue of the highest quality—modesty itself? So the situation remains unchanged, timidity still hesitating, still refusing the jump, faith and expectation still believing—a most uncomfortable stalemate!

The other way is to value the high expectations of our best friends as one of life's most powerful inspirations. Of course, their high opinion of us is a huge exaggeration of the truth. Of course, it never can be fully realized, for our very best endeavours, our greatest possible successes, will only raise it still higher, still further beyond our finest possible performance. But we may rightly assume that there is at least a grain of truth in it for, after all, it is the opinion of our best friends, people whom we not only love but whose opinion we are bound to treat with a decent amount of respect. Furthermore, we should feel ourselves

honoured in representing them through their opinion of us, at least as the truth in the making; and we cannot do better than accept the responsibility of helping to justify their faith in us in so far as our most willing and intelligent efforts enable us. To treat the highest opinion of our best friends, their highest expectations for us, as constituting an ideal to live up toward, supplies us with a most powerful urge to strive mightily.

If this is true for you and for me, it must certainly also be true for the other fellow, and we must then accept what I have called practical idealizing of the other fellow as an essential attitude of friendship. One of the most important modes of friendship is its give and take. If it is not "more blessed to give than to receive" it certainly is more pleasant, more satisfying, and easier on our pride to give, but friendship demands that we do both with equal grace, equal consideration, and equal happiness. Indeed, I believe that a very reliable criterion of the health and strength of a friendship can be found in the balance of this interchange of service between the friends. I do not mean by this that the bal-

ance should be a tangible or even a calculable one of definite terms, but, quite the contrary, one which is measured by the happiness with which the recipient accepts favours and services, large or small, from his friend. If one can accept without the least idea of mechanically calculated repayment in kind but only with gratitude and renewed affectionate appreciation, then, what I have clumsily called the balance of give and take is characteristic of the highest type of friendship. It takes a bigger friend to receive than it does to give, for it often means conquering false pride, which is apt to be a pretty big victory, but friendship requires it and is as demanding of unselfish consideration in this as in every other regard.

Friendship is, then, not just a matter of cold, purposive idealism; the very heart of it is sentiment. It begins in feeling, pure and simple, and we raise it to the ethical plane by making it purposive. Nevertheless, the fires that were its beginning must be kept burning or the whole relation loses its warmth and falls back on cold reasoned purpose. Besides the sentiments of truth, honour, and justice, which are obviously as important in friendship as in any other human

relation, there is loyalty. Is not this the sentiment of sentiments? Does it not really include all the others? To be loyal to your purpose toward your friend is to be devoted. To be loyal to his best interests, not to contribute to harmful lesser demands but to his really important needs, is to be intelligently devoted. To be thus loyal is not just loyalty to the safety of his vegetative life but to his life as a whole, to its success and therefore to his happiness. And most important of all is loyalty to your greatest expectations of him, in short, to your ideal of him which must survive his failures and shortcomings. Is it not this particular loyalty which is not only characteristic but really an inseparable part of the central emotion of friendship? And does it not also include an even wider form, namely, loyalty to the ideals and purposes of the relation itself and, therefore, must it not stand the brunt of all the emotional clashes inevitable to any friendship, no matter how solidly founded on real affection or how high its ethical plane? This wider loyalty, being compounded of both love and idealism, must survive in the face of either failure or frustration, disappointment or resentment. Indeed, it should

grow even stronger in the presence of such checks; for since it is loyalty both to our own love for our friend and to our ideal of him and does not spring merely from admiration for his accomplishments, much less should it be governed by contempt for his concrete failures.

If this be true, then friendship carries a non-transferable responsibility which circumstances cannot alter. Let us test this statement. Suppose your friend, for whom among other ideals you hold that of honesty, should prove dishonest; he disappoints your expectations by an act of dishonesty. What then? Is your ideal less valid? Does it not survive as an ideal? If it does not, it is clearly not an ideal. Surviving, does it not still hold as an ideal for your friend? Does your disappointment, or the concrete fact of his failure to live up *toward* your ideal and his of honesty, detract in the slightest from the validity of the ideal? Should his failure divert your love from your ideal if the ideal is unaffected? Does his failure in any way alter the responsibility you long since accepted, not on a basis of experience or fact but on the basis of affection, hope, and idealism? Does not this responsibility remain un-

changed? Is it not in his failure that he exhibits his greatest need? Surely it is the very time when a "feller needs a friend," and should you not be ready with both affection and understanding to meet this greater need? In short, whether your friend has lied or stolen, is not your responsibility toward him just the same? Are not your ideals for him just the same? Is not your desire to contribute to his welfare and happiness the same; not just the same, for are not all these stronger in response to his greater need? The moralist might answer: "No, my stern duty to the state or to society or to my own virtue is such that, my friend having sinned, I must cut him off as unworthy." Would that be friendship? As a matter of fact, friendship with a social culprit does not by any means involve the slightest approval or condonation of the misdeed or the fault; on the contrary, it may well necessitate the exact opposite, even to aiding the state or the social powers-that-be to place the friend in jail, if need be. Indeed, aiding society in its duty might well be the best service one could render the culprit, for the responsibility, the ideals, and the loyalty of the relationship here labelled

“friendship” are the protectors and guides of the love which is its strength. They insure its practical immortality, and that being so they surely must survive mistakes, disappointments, and shortcomings.

So, when to sympathetic understanding and affection guided by intelligence and expressed as rational devotion to the welfare and happiness of the friend we add loyalty to the relationship and especially loyalty to the ideal we hold for him, have we not completed the picture of what the ideal and aim of friendship should be?

From the above, it is not to be concluded that in friendship we ordinarily go through any such self-conscious process of analysis of motives and emotions. On the contrary, we are ordinarily quite unaware of the specific items of the relationship and, furthermore, have no cause to question either our motives or our technique. It is only when the relationship is threatened by misunderstanding, antagonistic emotional reactions such as jealousy, anger, or even just disappointment, that some such understanding of the fundamentals of the relationship becomes essential or even useful. But it is, I believe, at

just such times that a clear understanding and a fresh crystallization of one's purpose will, with the aid of loyalty, enable one to avert the saddest thing in the world—a broken friendship.

Of course a friendship without ever breaking may simply lapse for lack of contact, or because for some other reason opportunity for expression has been lacking. In that case we might say it has been retired to an inactive state. Being inactive, it may, nay, probably will, retrograde for lack of emotional nourishment and finally exist only as a memory. But often such inactive friendships, when through fortunate opportunity they are reawakened, spring into activity again, showing surprisingly little retrogression. Furthermore, it must be understood that what I have attempted to describe under "Friendship" is a psychological and ethical skeleton of this relationship, and it must also be remembered that the ideals ascribed to it are *ideals*, descriptive of ultimate but of course never quite realized perfection, always to be aimed at and striven for, especially in times of trouble. In short, it is hoped that, at such times, when the demands of ego run counter to those of friendship, when disappoint-

ment, chagrin, or jealousy threaten the progress or even the existence of a relationship already welded into life, the situation may be saved and much unhappiness and waste avoided by an honest survey of the forces involved, the purposes to be served, the ideals to be preserved, and the personal demands to be evaluated. It must be confessed that at worst, even with the best intentions and most intelligent efforts on the part of one individual, if there is no satisfactory or even reasonably adequate response from the other, or if there be an actually inimical response from him, the friendship is of course blocked from further progress. Probably nothing can be done about it, and the relation must be allowed to lapse, even if the loyal friend preserves his own desire to reestablish friendship. If the lapse is long enough even this may fade and die. At the very worst, if one, through lack of understanding, emotional rebellion, or for any other reason, suffers a broken friendship, there is still something to be gained by an honest review; through understanding the cause of the failure, as well as by revaluing the factors of the situation and the qualities of the friend, one can

carry away much of value to be applied to every remaining friendship; then, out of the wreck, we can at least emerge wiser, more tolerant, and with a greater capacity for friendship for the sake of our other friends.

Finally, if friendship is a good prototype of all personal relations, its ideals, its purposes, and its technique, as well as the responsibility which these involve, apply to all other relations also to some degree. The degree of course varies enormously—largely according to opportunity, also according to desire—from the least important and most casual to the most important major friendships, whether found in marriage, between parents and children, teachers and pupils, or just between friends.

Yet how easy it is, when we have reacted to frustration by anger, to rationalize this perfectly natural and typical emotion into righteous indignation. How easy it is, if our friend happens to be the culprit who has so thoughtlessly caused us this discomfort, to exaggerate his offence until it more than justifies our reaction. How quickly under these circumstances do we lose our grip on our friendly purpose and our appreci-

ation of his. How very simply and automatically does the desire for revenge or retaliation, the strong primitive drive to get even, take the centre of the field, and how readily does it lend itself to the disguise, so much more flattering to our self-esteem, of a stern and virtuous duty to punish the offender for his own good. His natural reaction of self-defence is all that is now necessary to put a first-class quarrel well on its way, and friendship is at least suspended. At such times, instead of sentimentality, prayers, tears, or forgiveness, the rational and sure method, both preventive and curative, is to think honestly, especially in regard to purpose, recrystallize the latter, and thus force one's self back on the ethical plane of friendship.

It is always some primitive emotion that drags or threatens to drag one down from this plane and away from one's purpose; then either self-protection or vanity causes us to mistranslate our slip from the straight and narrow path as something far more creditable than it really is. Maleducation is somewhat to blame for this final confusion, for we are not taught, as we should be, that emotions are of no moral signifi-

cance and that we are responsible only for how, when, and why we express them. Falsely taught, we struggle to overcome anger, one method of victory being to make believe it is something else. We thus confuse the issue and in our confusion lose our understanding of the situation and consequently our purpose toward it and our grip upon it.

Jealousy presents precisely the same threat in any human relation whatever form of friendship it may be, marriage, parent-child, or just friendship. It is perhaps the emotional state of all others which is least apt to be honestly dealt with and therefore, rather than because of any inherent quality, it is the most dangerous. Again the traditional morality, as applied to emotions, is responsible for much harm. Jealousy we are taught is a despicable thing, something no really big person ever suffers. It is a sentiment, we are told, that characterizes only the small and mean natures. We are taught we must not have it, we must not because we ought not, therefore we cannot acknowledge its presence without at the same time classifying ourselves as mean, small, despicable. A fine quandary this in which to

put a fully endowed normal human being when he is trying to use all of his primitive forces in the difficult job of being a civilized citizen! To take one of these forces, and a very strong and universally present one at that, and ask him to ignore it, to make it nonexistent, is no more helpful than to tell him to make believe he has no left hand but that, at the same time, it is his duty to be skilful in the use of both hands, and indeed that his success depends on using both to their full capacity. One cannot urge the helpfulness of competition or the inspiration of emulation unless one accepts the fundamental emotional basis of these excellent provocatives of individual progress. As in all other matters, the make-believe involved in refusing to acknowledge the presence in us all of anger, fear, vanity, and above all, as far as human relations are concerned, of jealousy, is not only useless but positively dangerous. Unacknowledged and of course therefore misunderstood, these primitive emotional forces will then express themselves, not according to our plans and purposes but in ways and at times which will completely frustrate those plans and purposes. On the other hand, if we acknowl-

edge jealousy when it appears, are we not then in the best possible position to decide whether we shall yield to its primitive urge or use its force as we may choose, according to our plan? If we rid ourselves of the ancient misconception that its presence is significant of meanness or, indeed, that it is of any moral significance whatever, we are in just as good position to use it as when we thus treat anger and fear and use their forces subject to our purposive choice. Can we not go further than this and take jealousy as at least as excellent a source of energy as anger, or fear, or parental feeling, or any other instinctive force? Is it not true that the more intensely we love a job, a nation, a child, or even a thing, the more is jealousy apt to make itself felt? Is its presence not a fairly good index of the intensity, if not the quality, of our feeling, our attachment, or our devotion? It is hard, very hard to make use of anything, especially an emotional state, if you have contempt for it. Fortunately we have no reason to hold any part of our primitive emotional outfit in contempt. So, if for no better reason, do not hold jealousy in contempt, for it is a very natural, primitive reaction and, if not used, ex-

pend its force in bitterness and destruction. Acknowledge it as you would its cousin fear or its sister vanity, and see in it a sign of strength which can be as cleverly used to gain the highest purpose of devotion as can any other strength. Be purposive and intelligent, in spite of jealousy, and jealousy with all its force will fall in line behind your purpose. On the other hand, give it full sway, feed it, brood at its dictation, wallow with it on its own primitive instinctive plane, and it will retire you from civilization and your own progress, and will throw the relationship within which it has appeared on the rocks. Then has the primitive usurped the throne of Reason and a human relationship fallen back into emotional chaos.

CHAPTER IV

MARRIAGE

*Friendship as a Vitally Important Basis—
The Welfare of the Other Fellow—Guiding
the Force of the Sex Instinct—How to Fulfil
the Promise of Marriage—The Deserting
Partner—Most Failures Preventable*

THAT marriage is the most important of all human relations, I assume no one will dispute. It always has been since the dawn of civilization and, in some form or other, probably always will be. It is so important, not only because of what it means to the man and woman but also, and perhaps chiefly, because upon it is founded the whole social fabric of civilization. Should all marriages or even a large proportion of marriages fail, would not the whole social structure tumble about our ears? If a large proportion of the bricks in a wall crumble away, what becomes of the wall? If a large proportion of families disintegrate,

the structure of which they are the bricks must clearly suffer a similar fate. And yet, how many young men and women rush into marriage on the crest of an emotional wave without the slightest idea, ethically and socially speaking at least, of what they intend to make of the relation, of what success in it requires, or of what failure implies. There is no good reason under the shining sun why girls should not know all about marriage, why they should not be adequately educated to think honestly, directly, and purposefully about it, so that they may be properly prepared by understanding to meet so great a change in their lives, or rather a series of so great changes, adequately and successfully. Nor is there the slightest excuse for fathers allowing their sons to undertake so great a responsibility in ignorance, modified though hardly enlightened by whatever they may have picked up by hearsay or worse. Why should mystery, vulgar nasty-niceness, and impractical sentimentality still persist about a relation so transcendently important, so full of possibilities of either superlative happiness or superlative misery, and withal a relation so intensely practical?

Why should we not think of marriage as a sort of friendship? It has its instinctive basis like any other friendship. It requires guidance by intelligence, for to become a progressive purposive relation it must, just like any other friendship, have its emotional forces guided to that purpose. Also, as there are degrees of success and perfection in friendship, so are there just such degrees of success, fullness, and stability in marriage. Of course, it is a very highly specialized and specific sort of friendship, but still these similarities are valid or, in other words, if friendship it be, the same psychological laws, the same principles, will apply. Let us see how this hypothesis works out.

The beginning of marriage is in courtship, and here, as in friendship, we can say again that it is the unexpected, not the planned, that happens. It is as true of potential lovers as it is of potential friends that they certainly do not go about with set specifications looking for the mate whose qualities, *avoids*, and measurements will exactly fill the bill, even though they may dream of not one but a dozen "ideals." On the contrary, "falling in love" is an accurately descriptive

phrase, for it happens just like that. The first reaction of one human being to another is attraction or repulsion to some degree—in this case obviously attraction—just a plain, pleasant, emotional reaction. If it is to be falling in love, then a specific mechanism, the mating instinct, is stimulated into activity and the attraction becomes the specific desire, however it may later be expressed, of one sex toward the other. If this were all there is in it, then there would be mating or not, as the case might be, but certainly no marriage, no family, and certainly no responsible ethical human relation. But other instinctive forces weave their way into the emotional pattern, for thoughts of home-making and of children, of a new family in the making as a social unit, enter into the picture, and the natural desire for these adds fuel to the emotional fire. Even then, without intelligence, that is, without discriminative purpose, plan, and ideal the relation would still remain on the instinctive plane and could never be permanent, let alone progressive. Like other friendships, it has unconsidered emotional beginnings and likewise calls for understanding to formulate its pur-

poses, to pick its methods, and to guide its progress.

As to purposes, it should not be difficult to formulate these. In the first place, there is the welfare and happiness of the other fellow just as in every other friendship. To contribute as best one may to that is the first purpose; to desire most mightily to do so, to find that one's happiness is absolutely dependent on being given the right to do that specifically by being the best husband or wife one can possibly be to the other fellow, to desire greatly and long for that privilege. Is not that the "passionate kindness" called being "in love"?

Friendships are all different, not just because people in themselves vary so much but also, and perhaps chiefly, because each person's life presents such different opportunities for contribution, such different problems for one's understanding, and because each person differs also in his or her particular ability to understand and to contribute. Thus, by discovering new opportunities to contribute and new powers of contribution, the richness of friendship grows with intimacy. It is largely in this richness of op-

portunity that marriage differs from other friendships. Every opportunity to be found in any other friendship is found in marriage, save only those which are peculiarly inherent in friendships between men or between women. Besides, marriage presents opportunities for contribution and service and many such, which are found only in friendships between the opposite sexes. Finally, marriage offers opportunities for contribution to welfare, happiness, and pleasure which are absolutely unique to it.

Thus it seems that this relationship may well be considered an all-inclusive friendship between a man and a woman. Its primary emotional basis is the same as that of other friendships, but with certain very powerful instinctive elements in addition. There is, in other words, not only the desire for companionship, the urge to be important in that relation, but also, the stronger and more specific urge of sex which adds its great driving force to every one of the other emotional elements involved. This specific instinct may be the first aroused or it may appear later in an already established friendship of the more neutral sort. Whenever and however it is

aroused, it then furnishes the specific emotional drive of that approach to marriage called "courtship."

Primitive courtship is of course hardly more than the direct expression of the chief emotion involved, its object merely the securing by fair means or foul the desired mate, but civilized courtship has not only the sex drive but also all the emotional drive characteristic of friendship behind it. From this rich emotional background, it derives not only force, but from it are evolved useful sentiments characteristic of all other human relations as well as those peculiar to courtship itself. Furthermore, this rapidly progressive relation presents a most useful and necessary period for the formulation of plans of life, for crystallizing the mutual purposes that shall obtain in marriage, and for ripening mutual knowledge and understanding of one another. It is also an opportunity for the development of mutual consideration and self-restraint, thus being an excellent preparation for life partnership. It is during this period of planning and growth of the relationship through thoughts of home-making and children that the parental instinct finds

its opportunity to join the emotional forces at work. Thus the relationship of marriage-in-the-making gathers back of it a tremendously powerful set of emotions—the desire for companionship, the imperative wish to be of importance, the sex drive, and the parental instinct, not to speak of curiosity and pride. From this rich field of emotional force all the useful sentiments draw their strength, such as loyalty, self-sacrifice, service, reverence, admiration, hero-worship, and all that goes to make up romance. These express themselves in sympathetic understanding, consideration, tenderness, protection, and an idealization of the loved one, the sum of which transcends in power and quality anything to be found in ordinary friendship.

Too often, when courtship culminates in marriage, it unfortunately ceases as courtship; the relation is considered accomplished, completed, and, after the honeymoon, is supposed to carry on by its own momentum. Whether marriage be considered a contract, a sacrament, or an experiment, too often do the contracting parties settle back into an almost irresponsible, even if hopeful, state of routine relationship. The race is won,

the marriage is consummated, and, like a well-built ship, why should it not float along on its own buoyancy? Because no human relationship stands still. It either starves or grows. Every human relationship grows only through increased mutual understanding and, based on this, greater contribution. Every human relationship, and especially the marriage relation, degenerates into a mere humdrum custom unless it is so fed and nourished. Many a marriage which has had a good start in courtship falls into a state of stale negative failure because it is allowed to lapse by default. It is, of course, very natural that there should be a fall in the emotional thermometer when the honeymoon is over and the man takes up the burden of support and the woman the cares and business of home keeping; when, in short, the business element of the partnership becomes, if only by its novelty, so relatively prominent. But there is no reason why this preliminary slump should be allowed to condition the whole relationship or be accepted as the normal and necessary spirit of marriage. Indeed, it is at this very time that the purposes and promises, the plans and ideals characteristic of court-

ship should be recrystallized, reëstablished, restated, and above all reëxpressed in the same terms and, moreover, far more fully than in courtship. The fancied security to be found in the legal-contract aspect of marriage or in the morals which conventionally guard it is false; for these are but flimsy defences, too weak to withstand any but the mildest emotional rebellion. A marriage so based is merely a complex social arrangement on the *quid pro quo* basis, a sort of housekeeping concubinage, in lieu of which divorce is infinitely preferable. It is often at this time and in this state that the woman questions her own emotions. Has she made a terrible mistake? Does she really love her husband as she should? She is conscious of an emotional slump, she concentrates upon it and remains within its circumference. If she has been unfortunate enough to have dabbled in Freudian psychology she very likely will come to the conclusion that she has serious "repressions," and "complexes," and that her "libido" needs freedom. Unless her habitual inhibitions are strong, she may be led to make some pretty serious if not fatal social experiments. But if, on the other hand, she would

just accept the emotional slump as a natural phenomenon, both in herself and in her husband, and would take up again her courtship rôle with greater skill and devotion than ever, then at least her part of the relationship would again be on the road to success. Finally, if the husband, on his part—and be it said that he is even more liable to errorful failure than she—would likewise reëstablish his rôle of lover, the marriage would soon become what it should be, a progressive courtship, the great adventure in friendship, depending neither on laws nor conventions for its security but transcending them all.

In all this, wisely planned early education and training would avoid many mistakes and much unnecessary misery. Obviously the success of so important a relation as marriage should not be left solely to experiment. The ideal to be striven for, the purposiveness of the relation, its physiology, and its place and significance in civilization should all be clear before, rather than after, the contract is signed, before, rather than after, the adventure is undertaken. Trial marriage, on the other hand, has been tried out in various primitive civilizations and, later, in certain retrogres-

sive social groups. It has always failed and always will, whether it is advocated under a new name such as "companionate marriage" or not. By its very nature, which is experimental and not planned or considered, with little responsibility toward society and none toward posterity, it cannot contribute to civilization. It is only a muddle-headed substitute for intelligent preparation for and acceptance of the responsibilities, ideals, and purposes of the monogamous family.

It should be made clear that monogamous marriage is, as far as we know, the kind of marriage that has proved itself the most suitable to the needs of civilization, the kind of marriage that best insures the success of the family unit and the happiness and welfare of its individuals, but that it involves ideals of conduct which must be striven for by all concerned to be measurably successful and, finally, that its progressive realization is by no means a foregone conclusion. Indeed, it presents ideals particularly difficult to realize, and the more clearly this is understood, the less danger is there of failure.

The main instinctive force upon which marriage rests is the sex or mating instinct. This in-

instinct contains within itself no morally selective element. It is, on the contrary, entirely heterodox. Any man may arouse it in any woman, and any woman in any man. Whether this arousal is convenient or not, whether or not its expression would be contrary to convention and ideal, in no way affects the fundamental and natural fact of its existence. The sex instinct is no more a respecter of persons and conditions, let alone conventions, than are fear and anger. It is the ideal of civilization that imposes upon us the responsibility of guiding the expression of our instinctive forces into purposive channels, and so it is the ideal of monogamy which demands that the sex instinct be expressed only toward the one individual whom we have chosen as mate. This ideal exists as a necessity, certainly not because the instinct automatically and without guidance tends to express itself only toward one mate, but for the very opposite reason—that it does not so tend.

Even though the instinct is naturally errant, it becomes progressively less so through training. Devotion to the one mate conditions to a great degree the responsiveness of this in-

stinct, so that through habit it becomes more reliable, less troublesome, though, be it said, never fool proof.

A mistake is often made in taking an ethically unsuitable excitation of this instinct too seriously. Its most frequent form is to consider the excitement as wrong and immoral in itself, rather than to accept it as a purely instinctive reaction involving no responsibility toward itself but, on the contrary, as throwing responsibility toward the social and ethical situation into the highest relief. Many a poor "problem" play is based on another form of this mistake, namely, that of taking an errant sexual attraction, especially on the part of a married man or woman, as the expression of the most idealistic romance. The emotional reaction is played on and dressed up to appear so powerful and noble that one is led to accept it as a higher truth, transcending all laws, especially conventions and ethics; as so high and mighty, indeed, that it contains within itself its own licence to expression and satisfaction and, finally, that because of these fancied attributes its satisfaction is absolutely mandatory. This attitude is, of course, not confined to

plays. It is far too frequently the dramatic rationalization of domestic failures in real life.

Monogamous marriage is the basis of the family of civilization. Its failure is always a loss to society but it is hardest by far on the children—and it is not just hard on them because of the social stigma which it involves but, also and chiefly, because of the far-reaching emotional effect it has upon them. The parent-child relation is the very nucleus of the child's early emotional life. Children not only depend emotionally upon their parents and feel unhappy and starved without that parental relation, but they also look up to them, admire them, and imitate them, both consciously and unconsciously. Many little tricks and mannerisms of the young child, erroneously supposed to be odd and striking bits of heredity, are really the result of their affectionate imitation. A child can have but one mother and but one father. It may have any number of step-parents or foster parents, but only one real mother, one real father, and the child's emotional life demands reality in this all-important relationship. There is just one sort of family, in other words, which is the best for the child physically,

emotionally, and ethically, and that is the monogamous.

For what benefit they receive from it children repay a hundredfold to such a family. To be sure, they are first only the physical outcome of marriage, but immediately they constitute its primary responsibility and at once supply it with an absolutely permanent, nontransferable purpose. Even if they did not in their very lives supply the greatest interest and yield the most satisfying affection to their parents, they still would pay in full for their dependence by supplying in their mere existence the very keystone to the arch of permanent marriage. They constitute the unalterable bond, both emotionally and ethically, between their parents. In short, they not only need the monogamous family, but they, by their very existence, constitute its most important purpose and most permanent bond.

As in all other friendships, so in marriage, loyalty is the most useful and powerful sentiment: loyalty to the welfare and happiness of the partner; loyalty to the success of the group, as a group; loyalty to each one of its individuals and

to the ideals of the group; and, lastly, loyalty to the ideals each one cherishes for the others. This loyalty must express itself to count, and when it does express itself we call it devotion.

The progress of marriage toward a fuller realization of its promise depends, then, on a clear comprehension of its possibilities as a progressive relationship in which each person's purpose toward the other is expressed as intelligent as well as affectionate service; in which community of purpose rather than similarity of tastes is essential; in which children constitute the additional but paramount responsibility as well as the paramount purpose; in which many of our strongest instinctive drives are involved and supply it with an abundance of emotional force; and, finally, a relation which, above all others, yields satisfaction and happiness through intelligent devotion.

When marriage is threatened by failure, then the purpose lost sight of must be recrystallized, the ideal revived, and intelligent plans of mutual contribution put into action, or else the relation will slip from the plane of ethical progress to

that of mere social tolerance and thence to intolerance and wreck. Just as in all other sorts of friendship marriage fails, when it fails, in nine cases out of ten because some countercurrent of emotion has sidetracked the partnership from its purpose. Perhaps it has been jealousy aroused by an errant emotional flare for another, or jealousy occasioned by the absorption of the husband in his business, or of the wife by her children, her house, her clubs, or her friends. It may be only emotional rebellion against the general weariness and staleness caused by the press of a humdrum, commonplace daily grind, unrelieved by sufficient play and recreation. Whatever this emotional and often purely innocent cause may be and however it may express itself, the situation can always be saved by the simple but difficult process of understanding the cause of disaffection and, on the other hand, of realizing again the existence and the fundamental importance of each one's purpose and intent toward the other. Disagreement and disaffection can then be made stepping stones as well as milestones in the progress of a better and more fool-proof relation. There is no reason why

such episodes in marriage should not be made quite as effective bonds as are lovers' quarrels in the stage of courtship.

When, on the other hand, either husband or wife has deliberately resigned from the spirit of the partnership, has rejected the monogamous ideal, whether secretly or openly, of course the relationship is on the rocks. The remaining faithful partner must then face his or her responsibility, still clinging to the ideal, as a loyal member of a monogamous family. The first effort, of course, should be to bring back the errant partner through realization of his or her responsibility to the group, especially if the group includes children. But let us suppose that this effort has been made wisely, intelligently, cleverly, consistently, and that it has utterly failed. The errant partner, in spite of a full realization of all that it means to the faithful partner and to the children, as well as to her or himself, rejects the ideal, rejects responsibility, and insists on his or her liberty. Then only two alternatives remain—either acceptance of the situation as it is, accepting a different standard for the family and expressing this new standard by alter-

ing the family life to suit the demands of the recalcitrant member, or standing fast to the old standards and cancelling the irresponsible partner's membership therein—the one and only poor advantage in the former arrangement being that appearances may be kept up. This keeping up appearances is difficult because of the internal and external emotional conflicts, not to speak of the unfairness of allowing the freedom of the double standard to apply to one member while the other upholds the old by living in chaste celibacy. Of course, where illness makes it necessary or advisable, continence in marriage becomes an expression of the most considerate devotion, requiring, however, understanding and wisdom as well as consideration on the part of both partners. But should this be a requisite of keeping up appearances when the two partners are in complete disagreement, it is fraught with the greatest difficulty. On the other hand, how about the worth of the old monogamous family standard? Is it better than the new? Is it better for the community? Is it better for the children? Which sort of family will the children approve, and which sort of family will they therefore be

most likely to build as their own when they grow up—the one they are used to, which their parents represent, or the kind that is held out to them as merely theoretically best? Unquestionably the former!

If one of the partners deserts, the other's responsibility remains unchanged and, furthermore, his or her responsibility to the deserter also remains. Not only what is in the long run best for the children, but also what is best for the deserting partner must be decided. Is it better for this human being to have his way? Should he or she be encouraged, protected, and comforted in this way and allowed to break down the standards of the group? Or is it better to help him by standing firm, insisting on the old standard for the family and allowing but one choice—either a place in the family, subject to the old ideals and standards, or frank and complete resignation from the family on the grounds that the only place open to him or anyone else in that group carries with it, as an inalienable part of it, the ideals and standards characteristic of it and for which the incumbent must take full and undivided responsibility. If the monogamous fam-

ily is worth while, if it is the best yet devised, is it not up to its members to support its ideals and standards against the individualistic, self-indulgent demands of its nonethical member or members? And is it not doing a recalcitrant member a fundamental injustice to allow him or her to undermine and stultify, through compromise, the progress of something so much greater and more important than himself? Is it not wiser and more just to force the rebellious or self-indulgent one to make an honest choice, either the cake or the penny, rather than spoil him still further by trying to give him both?

In short, when the condition is unalterable disagreement in what is the absolute essential of the monogamous family, should not the dissenter be excused from participation in its life? Absolute divorce under these circumstances would seem to be not only the logical but the ethical solution and, therefore, not something to be merely condoned, but a step to be highly and absolutely approved. It is better for the ship and the whole ship's company that a disaffected, let alone a rebellious or mutinous, officer be dis-

charged, and it is better, in the long run, for that officer's soul.

Open and recognized polygamy, in those countries whose civilization has not progressed beyond that point, is a decent but obviously lower form of marriage. The family is not a well-knit unit but a federation of two or more units, constituting a rather loosely woven whole. As the country progresses to a higher type of civilization this sort of marriage disappears, to be replaced by the monogamous type, just as, and probably somewhat because, its attitude toward its women changes and they emerge from being mere chattels, afforded in numbers by the rich, to being not only equals of the men but the very central figures in family life.

When polygamy is practised in secret and, furthermore, in a civilized community with the standards and ideals of which it is absolutely at variance, then it loses its decency, its economic *raison d'être*, and is purely a matter of sexual self-indulgence without ethical purpose or justification. The effect on the family of a husband or father who so indulges is of course obvious and

well known. The children are not only led to condone but to imitate, and, in so far as they do either, they are preparing for like failure in their own marriages. The effect on the community is at least not contributory to its ethical progress. The wife's responsibility seems, under the circumstances, clearly to be to keep the family intact as to its standards, to keep the children's vision clear, to save their ideals, and to give the self-indulgent husband the choice of living up to those standards or resigning. Only thus can she discharge fully her duty to the children, to the community, and to her own integrity.

Whether the errant partner be the wife or the husband, there is always a smoke screen of one sort or another thrown out by the culprit, not so much to fool the public as to fool himself into believing that his weakness is strength, that his unfaithfulness is a higher loyalty, that his neglect is a great devotion, that, in short, his misconduct is anything but pure self-indulgence.

The secret libertine poses, as long as he can, as the most moral of men, not infrequently as a very Sir Galahad, and, curiously enough, he often more than half believes it himself. This

phantasy of his not only serves him as a protective disguise but makes his conquests far more facile. His courtships are so well disguised that they not infrequently take on the appearance of pure missions, or noble and self-sacrificing rescues of the unappreciated. To blow this smoke screen away and bring realization of the truth to all concerned would seem to be not just the right but the duty of the other members of the family group. To do this is, in the last analysis, not only to the benefit of society but the one hope of saving the self-indulgent one from himself, not to speak of rescuing his victims.

What has been said of secret polygamy can be said with even greater force of clandestine polyandry. This is worse than the other, for obvious physiological reasons, and also because socially and emotionally the children are more utterly dependent on their mother than on their father. She is physically, emotionally, and socially the very centre of family life; therefore any unfaithfulness on her part reflects more directly, more violently, and more disastrously upon her children than similar misbehaviour on the part of the husband. The remedy, if remedy

there be, is the same—complete reform or complete resignation—if the standards of the family, its place in the community, and its progress are to be preserved.

Monogamous marriage, then, is not only desirable for every normal man and woman, but it would seem that it is the best form of relationship between the sexes yet devised, for it is absolutely essential to the integrity and success of the family in our present civilization. No other form, temporary or permanent, secret or open, has proved itself anything but harmful. The monogamous ideal has to be striven for, the very difficulty of realization being additional proof of its worth. Failures in marriage obviously cannot be considered proof to the contrary; furthermore, these failures are nearly all blazoned fully in the press and therefore we are apt to get the impression that they, rather than successes, are the rule, though the facts are quite the contrary. There are many more successful marriages and successful families than there are unhappy and unsuccessful ones, but these are not “good copy” and are never advertised in the press.

As far as I have studied failures at first hand

the vast majority are preventable, for the cause is precisely the same as in the failure of any friendship: self-indulgence versus devotion, stupid selfishness versus intelligent contribution; in short, instinctive self usurping with its demands the rights, needs, and desires of the other fellow and of the group.

Divorce is, of course, not an infallible remedy, nor is it always used as a remedy. Sometimes it is invoked only as a means of escape from annoying responsibility, or as a method of securing a more desired if not more desirable partner. The poorest excuse of all seems to me to be the so-called "incompatibility of temperament." This in my experience is almost always incompatibility of purpose, really no more, no less than a case of one or both individuals concerned being tired of a partnership in which one or both have sought emotional satisfaction rather than opportunities for intelligent contribution, in which sentimentality has worked hand in hand with self-indulgence to establish the relation on a primitive emotional rather than a primarily purposive and ethical plane. Divorce is then sought as an escape from further annoyance, as a relief

from emotional dissatisfaction and clash. Of such a divorce one can say that it is at least no worse, no more unethical than the union which it dissolves.

On the other hand, there are cases where well-purposed and high-minded people seek divorce because of some physical, emotional, or social incompatibility which, when all the details are known, seem fully to justify the proceeding. At all events, whatever the causes may be, it would seem that divorce is justified and can be accepted as a completely ethical step if, and only if, its purpose is acceptable and ethical. If each one concerned is honestly convinced that the welfare of the other will best be served by divorce, then divorce would seem thoroughly justified. Of course, if there are children, their interests are paramount and that they, too, will be better off if their parents are divorced must also be a matter of honest conviction or divorce is unjustifiable.

I feel convinced that were divorces really easy and without stigma there would be fewer of them, for marriage would be more nearly on the courtship basis and would depend for its success more fully and simply on the efforts of the participants.

The challenge to each to hold the affection, admiration, and devotion of the other would be more direct; there would be less excuse for either to consider the marriage as bondage, and, finally, when a divorce was granted, it would be a blow to the pride of the one who was responsible for the failure, rather than a stigma of immorality on both the innocent and the guilty, as it now so often is. All this, of course, provided that education were to pave the way to this relationship and prepare its candidates adequately. At all events, divorce is not necessarily an evil, but may be one remedy for an evil, and should then be considered no worse nor better than any other frank avowal of failure.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNMARRIED

*Marriage Not Necessary to Happiness—The
Normal Desires for Mate, Children, and
Home—The Answer to the Sex Instinct—
Friendship with the Opposite Sex—Blessed
Singleness*

A PROBLEM closely related to marriage, still unsolved by civilization, is that of the unmarried. By "the unmarried" I do not now refer to adolescents who have naturally every reason to expect marriage in due time. Theirs is a question of postponing sexual satisfaction and the other satisfactions and joys of marriage and family life until they have prepared for them. They need knowledge which their parents should give them through straightforward education, and they need friendly help in applying that knowledge. Their problem can be clearly defined, is easily understood, and presents no obscure

difficulties provided it is treated decently, which means, especially, without indecent prudery. That most parents do not so treat it does not change the facts. The problem of which I now speak, however, is not theirs but that of the adult men and women who have not married in spite of full maturity, who do not intend to marry, or who for some reason cannot marry. Their problem is for the most part still unsolved. Of course the problem always is an individual one—different for the rich and for the poor, different for a man and for a woman rich or poor, and different for different emotional natures whether male or female. There are, however, certain deeply rooted demands in all normal human beings which under the conditions of civilization cannot find complete satisfaction, either singly or as a whole, in any other state but marriage; there are, therefore, certain elements which, because they are common to all normal human beings, consequently, appear in the problem of any unmarried person, male or female, rich or poor, no matter what the temperament or emotional make-up may be.

The average marriage means to the normal human being first, a mate, someone exclusively his

or hers in the physical, emotional, and ethical aspects of that most intimate of friendships. Then it means home, the headquarters of that friendship and the headquarters as well of the family group for itself and in its relations with other families and other persons. Home is also, especially for the woman, more or less a storehouse for the significant and satisfying trappings of life, and is often also the object of much sentimental and æsthetic planning and effort. Home building, keeping, and beautifying, is apparently a very deep-seated and satisfying human function and finds its only fully complete expression when it serves a family unit, especially a family which is contributing to that natural and most satisfying purpose, the welfare and happiness of its children.

Children constitute the third element in the problem of the unmarried, for just as they constitute the biological purpose and main ethical and social *raison d'être* of permanent marriage and the monogamous family of civilization, so their absence creates for the unmarried or childless one of the severest deprivations.

Unquestionably marriage, when it reasonably

approaches all that it should be, is a most desirable state for the normal man or woman, as it is the only relationship which offers opportunities for the harmonious and ethical satisfaction of those great deep-seated forces of human nature, the mating instinct, parenthood, and home-making.

In spite of all this, however, marriage is not necessary to happiness, nor is it the only form of admirable and satisfactory existence, for so great is the elasticity of mankind, so enormous is his power of adaptation, that not only can he live in the arctic circle or at the equator or for years either as a carnivore or on vegetables and fruit only, but he can do the even greater thing of living in "single blessedness" though surrounded by obviously satisfied married people in their happy homes, and he can in doing so live well, admirably, and happily. Of course, to do this well takes more wisdom and character and perhaps greater honesty, for it means getting along without all that normal marriage connotes—without a mate, without children, and without home in the fullest and most complete sense of that term, and yet living fully and happily.

Let us consider each one of these items in turn and discover, if we may, just what the unmarried person has to deal with and how the successful ones succeed.

First comes the matter of sex. This instinct has suffered undue importance in the past through being treated with that vulgar nastyniceness called prudery, and of late, thanks to the broadcasting of Freudian and pseudo-Freudian propaganda, it has suffered undue prominence and distortion. However publicly overstressed or oversuppressed it may be at any moment, it always exists as the chief instinctive basis of marriage and, if marriage is not to be, it nevertheless still exists. Only in rare cases do we find an unmarried person unmarried because the mating instinct is so weak as to be practically nonexistent and, occasionally, we find a man or woman who has married in spite of this relatively rare subnormality. On the contrary, most unmarried people, both men and women, are inherently of normal endowment, though in some cases the mating instinct has been overpowered by fear or has suffered deformity through mis-education or unfortunate early experience, and

therefore, marriage has been deliberately or unconsciously avoided.

Since abnormalities of sex expression in these cases and the problems they present belong rather to psychopathology than to the present work, we will consider here only the problem presented by the completely normal, thoroughly endowed men and women who for economic, social, or romantic reasons have not married. With them the sex instinct is an active, but need not be at all a very difficult, let alone obstructive, element in their lives. However, as far as sex life is concerned, the problem still remains for the most part unsolved, for there has not as yet been found any really satisfactory, specific substitute for marriage. Prostitution is certainly not a satisfactory answer, even for the man, and it is notoriously and obviously woman's complete ruin, physically as well as socially. She is the victim, but man, the cause of her degradation, whether the first or last, also suffers, not only in the well-nigh inevitable diseases so caused, which he, rather than the woman, spreads through civilization, but he suffers equally with her the moral degradation, by being

the active, the positive, the demanding, the insistent partner in a human relation which, because of its utterly unethical purposelessness if for no other reason, is beyond the pale. There may be many degrees of prostitution but where the relation is established simply and only for the gratification of lust it is the prostitution of an instinct which civilization has reserved for its finest, noblest, and most far-reaching relationship, and can be called by no gentler name. This, then, secret or frank, is not a solution for the unmarried, not even for men and much less for women.

The sex instinct, like all others, is a force for the use of which the possessor is responsible. It has no laws peculiar to itself. It should be treated with the same frankness and guided by the same ethical laws we apply to all our other instincts. Thievery is not a satisfactory, let alone a necessary, expression of the instinct of acquisition nor is cowardice the only expression of fear. Why, then, should self-indulgence be considered the only solution for unsatisfied sex?

To consider satisfaction healthy and continence unhealthy is merely a convenient belief

for the self-indulgent. Scientifically there is absolutely no truth in it; indeed, as far as we have studied the matter in animals, the fact seems to be the direct opposite. When a stallion is in training for a race he is, as a matter of course, taken out of stud; similarly, human athletes are especially cautioned to abstain from sex indulgence as well as from all forms of excess. Yet many who fail still shelter behind this silly argument in self-justification. As a matter of fact, the sexual function may remain inactive with absolute physical normality indefinitely. In a woman as well as a man the inactivity is taken care of automatically if a reasonably good level of physical health is maintained.

The argument of the self-indulgent finds its only justification in the blind convention of the so-called "double standard" of morality which demands chastity only from women. Leaving all else out of the question, the fact that venereal disease takes such horrible toll of innocents, largely because of this fool convention, should be enough to condemn and eliminate it for all time. The very fact that the "immoral" woman is so easily and promptly segregated from society

limits at once her ability to spread disease among the innocent, while, on the other hand, the very fact that her guilty partner is looked upon with only humorous indulgence and has his social contacts and opportunities in no way curtailed, puts him in the best position to spread disease through every one of the avenues by which disease can be spread. This aspect of the "social evil" is never mentioned "in polite society," nor is it given the attention it deserves in any society. Nevertheless, the terrible proofs are there, only too easily substantiated by the cold statistics of hospitals, and vital records. If anyone pleases to doubt the validity of this one single argument against clandestine sexual relations in general, and against the double standard in particular, I beg to refer him to just two items of the record of horror: first, the percentage of conditions caused by venereal infection innocently acquired by women, necessitating serious operations, to be found in the surgical wards of any hospitals, and second, the percentage of total or partial blindness in the new born, caused by venereal disease usually innocently acquired by the mother. The list of deformity and disease both

physical and mental which can be traced to this disease is enormous, heart sickening, but these two items alone should certainly be enough to cure any honest doubting Thomas.

There is really no reason why the mating instinct should receive more, or less, attention than any other. It is only convention, blind convention, which has fooled us into hiding it under a cloak of indecency on the one hand, and hypocritically condoning its indulgence by man on the other.

Perhaps there is no entirely satisfactory solution for the high-minded and ethical unmarried. Knowing the facts and treating the whole matter frankly does, however, make it infinitely easier to handle. One must simply accept sexual desire as a perfectly normal phenomenon calling neither for suppression nor expression, in no way significant in itself of either morality or the lack of it, and above all in no way a sign of vulgarity, coarseness, or bestiality. The thing is much simplified, too, by confining one's responsibility strictly to the guidance of the force, bearing in mind that its presence is in no way our doing. Our responsibility to our purpose, and par-

ticularly to our purpose toward whoever or whatever has automatically aroused the desire, is thus made trenchantly clear and mandatory. Often this matter of continence is made not only complicated but disgusting by assuming that sex desire in itself is evil or, what is worse, that it does not exist. A hopeless struggle is then staged from which there can be but two outcomes: one is self-indulgence with all the self-blame or self-justification that it involves; the other is some form of vicarious expression of this force, the very existence of which has been denied. Undue sex curiosity, sentimental emotionalism, and, lastly and mostly, prudery are among the many probable vicarious expressions of misunderstood, disguised, or denied sex hunger.

Continence may or may not be more than a partial solution of this problem of the unmarried. One can only say that for the present, as far as the mating instinct is concerned, monogamous marriage is the only condition in which it can be given purposeful or, in the long run, ethically acceptable expression. Other expressions have proved unsatisfactory, most of them dangerous to health and happiness, all of

them undermining the foundation of society as it now is.

Promiscuity, either under the guise of "free love," clandestine relations, polygamy, or polyandry, whether secret or open, has proved nothing but a source of intense misery. However, it can be said and with absolute confidence that a fully occupied purposeful and friendly life lived with reasonable regard to physical hygiene makes it possible for any woman or man to live without direct and specific expression of the mating instinct. The force of this instinct can be used in, and as it were absorbed to a large degree by intellectual, social, and artistic effort or any other emotionally satisfactory, purposive, and sufficiently demanding occupation. But in order to effect this transference of power successfully and smoothly the individual must first have understood the problem, faced it frankly, and accepted it fully; then the mating instinct, together with all the others, will lend its force to a wisely planned, well-balanced, constructive life and will no longer torment its possessor. On the other hand, it can also be said with equal veracity and emphasis that, for either sex, a

purposeless, self-indulgent, unoccupied, and unhygienic life makes it a thousandfold more difficult to control *any* instincts and especially that of sex.

The next important group of instincts which needs recognition and modified expression by the unmarried is the parental and home-making. Lack of satisfaction of these urges is, I believe, much harder on women than on men, certainly harder on most women than on most men, for a woman's emotional nature is richer in these very elements and therefore the lack of objective for them leaves her more dissatisfied and more lonely. To be unable to find expression for these great powers and desires outside marriage, which may for some reason be impossible, is, I think, the most severe part of the unmarried woman's deprivation and presents a far greater difficulty to her than mere continence.

The children of other people cannot be substitutes for her own. There can be no substitutes. Other children may, however, become objects of very satisfactory, compensatory expression. Fortunately the parental instinct does respond to other children, to any human being

old or young who is in any way helpless or in need of protection, indeed, to any young or relatively helpless animal, but this response does not yield the same satisfaction as she would get from her own children. It is different and should not be considered a substitute, else sentimental exaggeration will creep in; rather should she value these other relations for themselves, realizing that the parental instinct, being otherwise unemployed, is warming, illuminating, and giving life to them. For instance, the maiden aunt is not only an invaluable person, but her relation with her nieces and nephews is unique, non-transferable, exclusively hers, and, though it is not a substitute for children of her own flesh and blood, it does yield its own perfect satisfaction and happiness. This instinct may also warm and strengthen all her other friendships. Just as a mother's love spreads through every one of her other relations, so, because of the very opposite condition—unemployment, the childless woman's or man's parental love has greater urge to express itself toward others. Indeed, the expression of the mature instinct of parental love in the friendships of the unmarried gives a qual-

ity to those friendships which is not just compensatory, is not a substitute for something better, but a quality of unique worth in itself.

An unmarried man or woman leading a useful, well-balanced, and continent life will find friendship with the opposite sex capable of yielding the most satisfying, most lasting, and richest of relationships not in spite of, but because the sex instinct itself takes part in such relationships. It makes them different from friendships within the same sex, and often far richer, lending them, as it does, much of its warmth and strength though in a highly modified and largely non-specific form. Such friendships are in danger of wreck, however, if this sex element is ignored as non-existent. There is danger if one makes believe that such a relationship is "purely Platonic," for that, like all make-believe, is skating on thin ice; whereas, realization that it is a relationship between a man and a woman and that it therefore involves the force of the sex instinct, the power and warmth of which always needs guidance to insure its remaining in ethical and purposeful channels leading to the welfare and happiness of the friend, places the relation on solid ground,

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free from the traps and pitfalls of make-believe. No more valuable and fruitful friendships can exist than those between informed and honest unmarried men and women. If such friendships were honestly and highly valued, the silly stigma of conventional contempt for the unmarried woman, the old maid, would melt away, perhaps fewer women would consent to marriage simply to avoid this stigma, or to get a home or social position, and there might, consequently, be a decided reduction in the number of unhappy marriages.

As to the instinct of home-making, the opportunities for its expression are obviously governed rather rigidly by the economic status of the individual. This is one of the ways, but one of the most insistent and practical, in which the economic status enters into the problem of every unmarried person, either as a help or a hindrance. The problem is harder the poorer one is. The woman who has to earn her own living has a far more difficult problem in home-making than the rich woman with one or several comfortable homes. The latter has a ready-made headquarters for her friendships. She may also have a sister,

a mother, or a father to care for, in which case not only her love of home finds full expression, but also to some degree her parental instinct is employed.

The woman without such a home misses it for itself, whether she has relatives or not. She needs it in just the same way as the other. If she has a dependent relative to take care of, the hardship of the extra care and expense they would occasion may more than balance the emotional satisfaction of her maternal instinct. Feminism, when it says that women can find a completely satisfactory substitute for marriage, children, and home in a fine job, is wrong. Neither can a man—no matter how fine the job—substitute it for home and all that marriage means. One cannot be a substitute for the other. Being married has its problems; being unmarried, whether with or without a good job, also has its particular problems, and the latter arise chiefly from trying to live fully and well in spite of not being part, and a particular sex and parental part, of the family group. Economic stringency makes these difficulties greater, for it blocks the home-making

and home-keeping instinct, not allowing it even a compensatory partial expression.

Another element yielding much primitive satisfaction to parents and sadly lacking in the unmarried state is that instinctive feeling of perpetuation which our children give us. To parents, their own flesh and blood in the persons of their children takes on a certain biological immortality. This primitive satisfaction is sometimes expressed as carrying on the name, or the line, but it involves something more than just pride or even that curious longing for continuity of life. It includes these but more than these, a very strong interest and intense feeling of responsibility for those continuing lives, motivated by the most intensely personal but at the same time paradoxically unself-seeking love. It is the projection into the future, through our children, of the same feeling we have for our parents and grandparents and have learned to believe they have for us; this, whatever it is worth, is of course denied the childless. Perhaps the need of it expresses itself in the childless by a greater interest and satisfaction in contemplating the more

spiritual sort of survival to be found in the promises of formulated religion. However that may be, it is at any rate another example of how the childless have to look on as spectators of the activities and fruits of marriage, and have to find, not substitutes, but more or less satisfactory though certainly only compensatory expressions for what the others give and take so easily. Nevertheless, with all these difficulties both positive and negative to face, bachelor or maid can, and more often than not do, live full and happy lives. Certainly happier, if not fuller, lives than if they had married unwisely or had tried any of the so-called substitutes for marriage.

The most successful unmarried lives that I have known have all been marked by usefulness. Furthermore, the people living them have all apparently faced the inherent problem in single blessedness with intelligence and frankness; they have also been wonderfully kind, understanding, and what is more, favourite aunts or uncles, real or adopted; their homes, when they have any, are much more obviously the headquarters of their friendships than those of the

majority of married people. But as to the much-vaunted freedom of the unmarried, that seems usually to be conspicuous by its absence, for these successful lives are almost always nucleated about jobs whose demands are more rigid by far, as to time and place, than are the duties of family life. On the other hand, that very rigidity gives these lives a regularity and intervals of leisure which are certainly rare in lives of young housekeeping mothers. The most successful of these lives demonstrate again the marvellous adaptability of man, for they prove beyond doubt that he can live progressively and constructively, either married or unmarried, with or without a mate, with or without children, with or without a home, and yet not only make his life an asset to civilization but yield him both happiness and peace of mind.

It is, of course, possible that a solution for the unmarried other than continence as to sex and deliberate guidance of the home-making and parental instincts into other channels, providing adequate vicarious satisfaction, may yet be found. Many ways have been proposed but have so far failed. Possibly the economic bar to

home-making might be removed and, at the same time, the desire and capacity for childbearing and rearing might be gratified in single women by some quasi-financial, quasi-social, marriagelike contract, with a more or less temporary mate. A very difficult arrangement to envisage even if we put aside convention and taste, in view of the present needs both of the individual and of civilization; for, no matter how temporary such a relationship might be, it would have to serve not just the woman's needs but her child's, not just these but society's, and finally also the man's. In short, it would have to be a relationship marked by as far-reaching responsibility to all concerned as that of marriage itself. The responsibility might be limited in time, as between the parents, but obviously would have to be permanent as to the child. In justice to the child, it must be considered primarily as a problem of its welfare. Suppose conventions approved, suppose the relation legalized and therefore the child legitimate, would its life be to it more valuable than non-existence? Could a home with the limits that such a home would necessarily have—were the parents poor or

were they well-to-do, a home theoretically with, but practically without, a father, for presumably he would at best be a stranger in the background of the child's life—could such a home, such a family, especially if surrounded as of course it would be by complete families and homes, be satisfactory for a child to grow and develop in?

Of course, adopted children have thriven in just such conditions, and not always are those adopted by a married but childless couple the happiest. Often the childless widow or widower or the single woman, though rarely the bachelor, has made the ideal foster parent and given the child the happiest home and the fullest life. But we must not forget that these children first existed, and then were adopted, and that they certainly were not bred for the purpose. Their need was met, not created, by the lonely, child-loving foster parent; an ethically ideal situation existed, for the need was mutual and preëxistent; the happiness and welfare of each was at once inherent in the welfare and happiness of the other. A very different situation from creating a child in order to assuage one's own longing, and taking a chance

on perhaps incidentally filling this child's need and securing its happiness.

Indeed, it seems to me that adoption of children by single women, or men, is the most ethical and satisfactory use, wherever it is economically possible, of that great human capacity of parenthood. It would seem that adoption is not only often a satisfying compensatory method for the childless, but, if they happen to be well enough off to supply the children with the sort of home in which they would be happy and thrive, it might well be considered a duty, especially when one thinks of what would otherwise be the fate of those children. If there is any virtue in this argument for the unmarried, there can be no question of its truth when applied to childless couples, especially if well-to-do. Their opportunity is as great as is their danger, without children, of falling into a life of dual selfishness.

So it is possible and demonstrated in many fine lives that either man or woman can live without home in the fullest sense and without children, in short, can live in blessed singleness finely and fully; but it should be recognized that to do so calls for great qualities, honesty,

wisdom, and, to a greater degree than appears on the surface, selflessness, especially that selflessness which identifies its own happiness with the happiness of others. To those who succeed in living such lives all honour and love are due.

CHAPTER VI

THE CHILD

*Growing a Continual Change—How to Treat
the Stages in a Child's Life—The Rôle of Cir-
cumstance—Wise Understanding*

THE relation of grown-ups to children is second to none in importance, whether the grown-ups be parents, foster parents, or teachers. Obviously the future of civilization depends upon its children. The responsibility which they present to their parents and all other grown-ups is both immediate and absolutely nontransferable. It challenges the parents' powers of comprehension, their capacity of patience, and their loyalty to their ideal, to the uttermost. There is no relationship in which there are greater opportunities both for good and for evil; no greater opportunity is offered anybody for the use of his total intelligence, for the exercise of all his knowledge, and his whole capacity for

rational devotion, than in bringing up and educating a child. On the other hand, there is no relationship in which there are greater temptations for egotism, vanity, and sentimentalism to express themselves ruinously. For instance, parents there are who, either through ignorance or vanity, seem to cherish but one lowly objective toward their children—to make them like themselves. A mere modicum of modesty should be sufficient to show up so limited an objective as worthless, and even without modesty the knowledge that children anyway tend far too strongly to emulate their parents would at least save such parents much needless effort. However, taking the best motives and highest ideals for granted, many mistakes are made in the rearing and training of children simply because the parents lack knowledge, chiefly the specific knowledge of what sort of a creature a child really is.

A child looks in many ways, and acts in some ways, as though he were merely a miniature man; in short, as though the difference were merely one of age or size. This appearance, however, is deceptive, and having noticed in myself and in

other people an unfortunate tendency to think of and, therefore, to treat children as though they were miniature adults, it seems worth while to consider some of the really great differences which exist between a child and a mature person.

In the first place, the child is not just young—it is not simply a matter of his having lived a shorter time than the adult. The fact that we should always keep in mind in considering children is that they are incomplete beings, that they are growing and developing, that they are men in the making, and that the making is a very active process. Roughly speaking, this activity is in inverse ratio to the age of the child. For example, there is a greater difference between a child of five and one of two than there is between a child of five and one of eight. Again, there is a greater difference between a child of ten and one of fifteen than between a man of thirty and one of forty. These differences express themselves not so much in variations of size or form but most distinctly in function, that is, in the varying ability of the individual to adapt himself to his environment. In short, the most marked difference between the child of three

and that of five, and the child of five and one of eight, lies in the capacity for social adaptation of each one, and this is equally true all the way along the ladder of years.

In each age of its development, the child varies markedly from what it was during the age that preceded and from what it will be in the age to come. Comparing the child at any age, however, with the adult, we find certain outstanding differences. In the first place, these differences are manifested externally in its physical characteristics. For instance, early in life its head is markedly larger in relation to its body, even though the forebrain activity is much less than in the adult.

Again, there is, particularly early in life, little differentiation between the sexes. General sex characteristics are hardly marked at all in infants and grow very slowly until the period of adolescence is reached. The general characteristics to which I refer, which become so marked in adult life, are specifically known as the "secondary sex characteristics," as distinct from the development of the sex organs themselves. They include differences in bodily proportion,

distribution of hair, quality of voice, and constitute the physical aspect of the mental and spiritual differences between the sexes.

The mental characteristics of sex are also hardly noticeable in infancy and early childhood, but late in childhood and during adolescence the two sexes develop social attitudes, especially toward the opposite sex, which are quite characteristic. Roughly speaking, there is greater pugnacity and aggressiveness and a more definite protective attitude toward the opposite sex on the one side, and greater fastidiousness, dependence, and gentleness on the other.

Besides the physical characteristics which so obviously differentiate the child from the adult, there are both physiological and anatomical differences that we might speak of as internal. The whole vegetative organism of the child is marked by growth and development, and that means continual change as well as a plasticity and elasticity which differentiate the immature from the mature creature far more than do variations in size or actual length of life.

Especially interesting to us is the difference in brain structure, for this difference in the

great adaptor mechanism is the structural and physiological basis for the most marked dissimilarities between the child and the adult—namely, those of understanding, judgment, and, finally, behaviour. Many association fibres in the brain are not myelinated, that is, they are not insulated, and, therefore, are not functioning at birth or for some years after. The forebrain activity corresponds with this anatomical and developmental fact, for it is very small, practically negligible in infancy, and grows only very slowly. The tracts necessary for a function must be built up and completed for the service of that function before the latter can take place. This important biological fact has lately been very satisfactorily demonstrated by Dr. Tilney of New York. Progress along this most interesting line of research promises to throw far-reaching light upon the problems of adaptation. I shall quote very briefly the results of some of this work, for the facts which have thus far been ascertained have a direct and helpful bearing upon our present problem and will help us, I believe, to think more definitely of the child as a developmental problem.

Dr. Tilney has found that in the brains of new-born kittens only those centres are myelinated and functioning which are necessary for survival. As you probably know, kittens are blind and are unable to walk or run when they are born. They can, however, suckle and meow, and they paddle about in a helpless, awkward, and rather indefinite way. However, if they become separated from the mother, the paddling finally ends in their rejoining the family group at the base of supplies. It is found that the centres necessary for suckling, meowing, hearing, and the uncoördinated paddling about are developed so as to be functioning actively at birth and are the only centres so developed. Consequently, if a kitten becomes separated from its mother, it can hear the meowing of the others, and, guided by the sound, it soon joins the gang and, when it gets in touch with the source of supply, responds by suckling. Nobody would try to make a kitten see or run, let alone teach it tricks, with only these centres functioning, and, for similar reasons, to demand of an infant or child adaptations beyond its developmental age is equally stupid and doomed to failure. I feel sure that it would

help both parents and teachers in understanding children at various ages of development were they to keep in mind the biological example just quoted, for indeed, in the human young there is much the same condition to deal with, and it is well to keep this relationship between the ability to adapt and the development and coördination of the nervous system clearly in mind when trying to understand the psychology of children.

When considering the needs of a child, it is both interesting and illuminating to note the rather obvious parallelism that exists between its development and that of the race. However unsentimental and emotionally distasteful it may be, the human infant, from a coldly scientific point of view, is very nearly one hundred per cent a little animal at birth. The object of the most far-reaching and beautiful hope, the recipient of the warmest and most tender affection, potentially anything and everything humanly possible, he is, nevertheless, a little animal who has practically no frontal-lobe activity. Soon he emerges into a state equivalent to savagery, where there are some manifestations of thought; hence, he progresses to fairly well-trained

barbarism, to primitive civilization requiring greater frontal lobe activity which is acquired only after several years of training and other experiences, and at last, by dint of further experience, more training, many mistakes, and much travail, the state of advanced civilization is approached.

Assuming, for the time being, that a child's life may be roughly divided as I have suggested, one finds that each of these stages exhibits quite characteristic tendencies. Let us consider what we may call the pre-savage stage, supposing it to last from birth through the second year of life; the instinctive reactions serving growth and survival are then the most prominent characteristics; their presence and prominence are evidenced by hunger, anger, fear, and complete parental dependence. Temperament, that is, sensitiveness in some degree or other to the painful or pleasurable elements in emotion as aroused by environmental change, is present, is recognizable, and may in certain individuals be marked enough to be considered hypersensitiveness. Intellect, on the other hand, is practically absent. It is a potential spark, but as yet it is certainly not even

a tiny flame and has, obviously, little place in adaptation. Indeed, there is really small need for frontal lobe activity, for the parents of the infant do all of his adaptation for him. Constant training is very worth while but is only a matter of conditioning reflexes, so that food, sleep, and elimination may be put upon as firm an habitual basis as possible.

If we consider the next stage as that roughly corresponding to savagery in man, we assume that it covers the third through the seventh year of life. During this period the instinctive mechanism still predominates in adaptation, but the fact that individuals vary according to the relative strength of their instincts may become apparent, even marked, during this stage. It might now be observed, for example, that a child is rather more pugnacious than timid, or that the herd instinct is rather more or less active than in other children. At this stage of development curiosity becomes amenable to guidance through simple training, and suggestibility now also becomes a marked characteristic. Success in teaching or training children of this age depends absolutely upon recognizing the importance of

these two items. Temperament has become more prominent than in the last stage, and the child may show sensitiveness to a marked degree. Intellect is a rapidly growing factor, the spark has become a little flame, but it is still of slight power when compared to instinctive forces such as fear, curiosity, suggestibility, and sensitiveness. The child, in short, only begins to understand a little of the significance of physical and social phenomena, and he is perhaps aware of the coercion of environment rather than of its meaning or significance. Consciousness of self, in social terms at least, appears in this stage, for the child very definitely compares himself to others and develops pretty definite desires and revulsions toward social duties and social play. These desires and revulsions are powerful factors obviously calling for guidance. Toward the end of this stage it would seem particularly important for the child that work and play should become clearly differentiated, for this is essential to future understanding of the nature of work as well as to future appreciation of its value and worth. I believe that one should introduce work as objective, constructive, and responsible activ-

ity at this age, in small doses, of course, but always as work, never disguised as play. It has never seemed quite fair to me to fool children into working by making them believe it is play. The sooner they learn the difference the sooner will they value and like work, as well as play, each one for the benefits, profits, and satisfactions which properly belong to it.

Let us call the period from eight years to twelve in the child's life the stage of barbarism. By this time the physical habits should have been established; simple social adaptations to the child's immediate social group have become largely habitual. Instinctive traits have been well recognized and probably fairly well subjugated. Suggestibility has reached its full power by the end of this stage but is balanced by a comparable increase in intellectual development. Temperamental sensitiveness has also by this time become definitive, that is, it has applied itself specifically to the most prominent instinctive trends, or, in other words, the child has become specifically sensitive, for instance, to fear, anger, or curiosity. Intellect has developed far enough so that it, as well as suggestibility, offers the

teacher or trainer his opportunity, while curiosity has become intellect's best instinctive ally. Because of the increased power of intellect it is now of utmost importance to make whatever specific hypersensitiveness is present, objective rather than subjective, useful rather than detrimental.

Let us assume that the period including the twelfth and seventeenth years is comparable to the stage of primitive civilization. This takes us through adolescence to young adult life. Useful sentiments, in regard to his fellows individually, and to his family, school, and community groups are being formed during this stage, and should be well established at its close. In other words, the instinctive, that is, the emotional reactions should by this time have been pretty thoroughly trained and habituated to appropriate modifications—transformed into serviceable sentiments in regard to social relationships and appropriate adaptations to society. By the end of this time a considerable and reliable body of ideals regarding society has been formed, motivated, and warmed by these social sentiments just mentioned; they should be expressing themselves fairly habitu-

ally and constantly in all the ordinary social relationships of both play and work. Suggestibility present in full strength at first, rapidly decreases, till it is less important than intellect, which already plays a leading rôle by the end of this period. By this time curiosity should have become intellect's faithful servitor and should have been trained to express itself in intelligent wonder, skeptical but careful observation, and ever less biassed, less emotional, that is, less wishful and less fearful thinking. Intellect is now by far the most important factor in adaptation; it is able to understand at least the first principles of adaptation of self to environment, and training should appeal to it directly, almost exclusively. Temperament is also an important item throughout this stage, for there may be certain developmental disturbances as the child approaches puberty which cause its sensitiveness to rise suddenly into prominence and become at least temporarily dislocated, so as to threaten adaptation. If it has not already been accomplished during the earlier stages, it is now if ever that hypersensitiveness can be bound to intelligence and made a permanent asset. If neglected

or unwisely treated, especially at this critical time, there is more than an equal chance that it will remain a constant liability.

There are individual differences to be found among children of the same age. Roughly, they may be said to arise from two causes: first, differences in inherent individuality, and second, differences in their economic and social groups. For instance, the child brought up on the farm is absorbing different ideas about life, particularly community life, from the city child; and the city child brought up in the squalid tenement section of a large city is certainly under a different social influence from the youthful inmate of a Park Avenue apartment house or a so-called millionaire residence on Fifth Avenue. Then there are the differences in familial relationships, not only the parental sympathy and understanding of the child, but the family sentiments in regard to honesty and loyalty, their traditions and attitude in regard to work and play, and whether the child is taught to consider himself a contributor or purely a passenger in the family group. The *lares* and *penates* of the household play their part in moulding the child's attitude

and reactions. All of these influences are factors in the social inheritance and environment and have a very important bearing upon the development and crystallization of his individuality.

Among environmental conditions are the child's educational experiences; for example, has he gone to a large public school, a small private school, or has he had a private tutor? Whatever the case may be, his development will have been influenced accordingly, especially if he possesses a hypersensitive temperament. The particular gang of contemporaries that he is thrown with, the popular opinion of his peers in school or at home have a powerful influence. What the other fellows think and do in regard to him is often more influential than anything his parents or teachers may say. Then there are great differences also in the educational influence of the intellectual and cultural life of the child's family. Are the family's interests wide or narrow? Are they scientific, commercial, or largely social in the narrow sense? Perhaps one of the most important factors in this connection is whether the child is an only child or one of many. The danger to the only

child of picturing himself as a special child and not like others, and the danger of his being spoiled, are too obvious for argument or elaboration.

Environmental influences also include those which are largely physical. The quality and quantity of food, whether the child is receiving a balanced ration, whether he is suffering from partial starvation or overfeeding; whether, in short, his life is one of reasonable comfort, of luxury, or of hardship—all these questions bear not only upon his physical but also upon his mental development. Whether a child is overfed or underfed, whether he is overworked or underworked are quite as important as whether he is suffering from over- or under-cultivation and education. Obviously, gross differences in his physical environment must affect his development profoundly, however it in its turn may be modified by the inherent tendencies he may possess.

Let us now consider the differences which are due to variations inherent in the individual. Temperament varies in different children of the same age quite as much as in the same child at different ages. It varies from extreme hypersensi-

tiveness to what would seem an absence of it, and this wide range is all within the normal zone. Hypersensitiveness is a two-edged affair, for, although on the one hand it endangers adaptation in the very degree to which it exists, on the other hand, the greater it is, the more it should be considered a potential asset. Hypersensitiveness, indeed, seems to me to present one of the greatest responsibilities of the teacher and trainer of children, for it can be made objective, made a servant of intelligence and thus form with the latter a sum total of ability for adaptations second to none, or if unguided or abused it may so easily become the basis of psychoneurotic miseries and maladaptation.

Normal children, capable of the finest adaptation, also vary markedly in their instinctive make ups. Quite early in their careers we can recognize the distinctly pugnacious or the distinctly timid, the markedly curious, or somewhat incurious child. The time of the first appearance of the mating instinct, as well as its relative strength and manifestations, varies considerably in different individuals. Likewise, some children are distinctly more or less suggestible than others, and

suggestibility, whatever its degree, may reach its maximum at widely varying ages in different children. One may be, in other words, more suggestible at the age of three than he is at twelve, and vice versa, although I believe that the average child is most suggestible at twelve and that after that his suggestibility diminishes.

There are obvious variations in intellect, taking this to mean inherent or basic intelligence. We have already seen that intelligence varies in the individual child from age to age, growing greater as he grows older, and that children of the same age show marked individual differences. This is a difficult item to measure, but needless to say it becomes clearer and less difficult to measure as development progresses. These differences in intellect may be roughly described as variations in the rapidity of learning, in the general capacity to learn, and in the rate of development, or increase, in that capacity. Speed in apprehension and in durability and clearness of retention vary in different individuals at the same age and sometimes vary quite surprisingly in the same individual from age to age.

To understand a child, then, we must realize

that it is not a fixed, static problem. It is not an adult. We must consider it first, according to its developmental age; second, in relation to its environment; and third, with regard to its inherent individuality, all of which in conjunction make the sum of its individuality to date. In short, the relative strength of the various inherent forces which influence adaptation show a marked variation in each individual according to his developmental age. These inherent forces show both a positive and a relative variation that is fairly regular and roughly characteristic of each stage of growth and development which every child goes through, and they also show variation both positive and relative in different children in the same developmental age. Lastly, environmental influences modify these inherent forces and markedly affect the final product at each age and every stage. For instance, in terms of practical application, one should not over-protect a timid child in the stage of savagery, for clearly it is his pugnacity that needs developing. Again, it would be distinctly a mistake to expect ethical response and understanding from a child in the stage of savagery, when frontal-lobe

activity has hardly begun. In the pre-savage stage, where there is practically no frontal-lobe activity, it would be not only useless but distinctly harmful to force intellectual growth, especially in an inherently bright child, though in the case of an only child or the first child, of course the parents' pride and ambition create a great temptation to do so. It is far better to develop such a child so that he shall be physically strong and emotionally stable, and this requires a careful training of his reflexes in infancy by means of an unexciting and particularly regular sort of life. A child of twelve in the stage of barbarism who has known only the most luxurious and protected life and who is fundamentally hypersensitive, certainly presents a different problem from a child of fifteen who might have reached the stage of primitive civilization in a favourable environment but who has known only physical hardship and a narrow social life, and has, therefore, only reached the stage of barbarism and is, furthermore, inherently pugnacious.

So, to understand a child we must consider not only his actual and developmental age and his

inherent tendencies but also give full weight to the social and physical elements of his environment, past and present. Only then can we know with any degree of certainty what we have a biological right to expect of him. It is this biological basis, and not what we wish to think ought to be, that should guide our judgment primarily. Furthermore, the ideal for his development should be normality rather than speed, sound health and emotional stability rather than extraordinary and phenomenal attainments. The infant prodigy, though a great source of unjustifiable pride to his parents and teachers, rarely makes good. Too often he pays the price of their foolish ambitions in ill health and final failure.

CHAPTER VII

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

What Is "Bringing Up"?—The Joyous By-Product of Happiness—Use Intelligence in Training Your Child—The Pride of Growing Up—Sex Knowledge—Separate Play and Work—Education: The Mental Side of Bringing Up—How and What to Learn—Linking Observation and Thought—Proposals for New Objects and Methods

WHEN parents or teachers discuss the bringing up of children, the subject divides itself rather naturally and somewhat chronologically into "training" and "teaching." By the former I mean the process which aims at the formation of useful habits with especial reference to bodily functions, and deals with personal conduct only to the extent of the most primitive social adjustments. Teaching or education, on the other hand, is used in the sense of mental

rather than physical training, leading to the formation of useful mental habits, right thinking, and the acquirement of specific knowledge both of man and of his environment. A more detailed consideration of these two aspects of the whole process of bringing up must be postponed for a moment until a much more important matter is settled. We must first determine, and determine clearly, what the purpose of this bringing up may be before we deal with its technique. Certainly the object of a method must take precedence of its details. Let us therefore be clear in our minds as to where we are going, what goal we wish to reach, before we plan the journey.

What do parents and teachers set as the objective of their efforts? What do they most wish for their children? Health, surely, for if they are healthy they will presumably survive, and their ability to succeed in life, obviously, will be greater than if they are sickly. It is equally clear, and for the same reasons, that they should have mental health, which is furthermore both a product and a cause of physical health. It is safe, then, to conclude that one of the main aims of the bringing-up process is to maintain physical

and mental health. But health, like strength, intelligence, or purchasing power, is, as any other instrument or tool in our hands, only a means of accomplishment and not an end in itself. The question then arises: To what further objective does health lead? It is almost axiomatic that health, especially mental health, means power, ability to do, ability to be effectual, and may therefore lead to the fundamental satisfaction called happiness. I believe that it is this happiness which is, or should be, the ultimate object of the upbringing of a child.

Let us consider then what happiness is. It may be described as a mental state of contentment, resulting from, and maintained by, successful adaptation to the world as it really is. From the ethical point of view, it is the joyous by-product of being useful, of contributing to the welfare and happiness of others. If, then, the ideal of service is to be the child's ideal toward which he is helped to grow; if the object of bringing up is to increase his ability to be useful to others; if his bodily health is valued primarily as a means to this end and he is taught so to consider it; if his mental health stands likewise as

the best insurance of his happiness; if happiness is taken to be a by-product of adaptation and that adaptation is, from the ethical point of view, a progressive process of being useful; and, finally, if these things are valued beyond the mere insurance of his purchasing power in dollars and cents and above gross material success, then, beyond doubt, the real objective of all our labours on behalf of our children must be their happiness, which is no more or less than the measure of their power to make others happy. This, then, being accepted as the clear objective of the process of bringing up, the next step is to turn to whatever scientific information is at hand and to use it for the children in their problems of adaptation—the parental goal being to insure their usefulness and through it their happiness.

Let us return now to a more detailed consideration of the two aspects of bringing up. The specific object of that part which we call training is, as already noted, to modify instinctive reactions and reflexes in such a way as to produce useful habits, especially in regard to bodily functions and as to the simpler elements of conduct. Obviously, during the stage of infancy,

training is the most important aspect of bringing up and deals, therefore, with matters of physical hygiene such as the quantity and regularity of food intake, and should aim at the early establishment of regular habits of elimination and sleep. It might also pay more attention than is usual to muscular coördination and condition. Indeed, I would recommend the early establishment of calisthenics, dancing, and other forms of muscular play, not only for their physical benefit but also to establish a proper pride in the physical condition of the body. Prowess in games with other children is quite attractive and offers additional reward for good physical condition, sufficient to make the whole process of physical hygiene alluring to any normal child.

The matter of simple social adaptation is important very early in the game, and certainly in the later stages of development it becomes of prime importance. It is in this matter of conduct training that one should be especially careful to pick the particular means of training appropriate to the mental age of the child, for it is here that inappropriateness of method, as well

as clumsiness of application, produces the greatest friction and rebellion. On the other hand, it is here that suitable methods and skilful application yield the best results with the least cost to the child. To use the analogy suggested in the preceding chapter, one may be dealing with a little animal who needs house breaking, with a very suggestible savage who needs training to the family group, or with a curious barbarian who wonders what it is all about and is having a very hard time becoming civilized. It is clearly important first to determine to which of these social ages a given child belongs before one picks out the specific method of training to be applied. One should not expect to find ready-made ethical attitudes. If the baby is treated as an intelligent youth or the youth as the ethically developed man, failure, emotional strains, and outbreaks of rebellion are inevitable. It would be no more grotesquely absurd to give a lecture on the fourth dimension to a group of Eskimos, than to appeal to a youngster of three on ethical and moral grounds. Of course, through every stage, one should be inviting the growing intelligence

to come farther and farther to the front, though never expecting more of it than the mental age of the child warrants.

In general, it is well to help the child to look upon the process of growing up, not as one of always greater restraint from which he would naturally try more and more to escape, but as a progress toward wider choice, more varied interests, and greater adventure, a progress marked by increasing privileges, greater self-dependence, and more honour, esteem, and power. There is always a more desirable position in the family, school, or gang to be offered for a better, more intelligent, more successful adaptation. Pride is always present and only needs guidance to become a constructive factor in this process.

The method in the early stages of training is as simple as its results are important, for it is a common-sense profit-and-loss one. Call it reward and punishment if you like, but let punishment be social and robbed of most of its usual means of physical pain (not that a spanking now and then is not the best short cut out of an emotional episode). One of the most important immediate objectives of early training is the establishment

of obedience as a habit. Obedience must precede reasonableness, for it is a biological anachronism to reason a child into obedience. Obedience first, explanations afterward, if at all, is a good basic rule, for obedience is not only in itself good training in adaptation but is simple and effective in bringing about prompt results in conduct—which, incidentally, is a considerable insurance against accidents. It is not at all difficult, nor does it involve as much punishment as it does reward, to teach a normal child that obedience pays, and mere repetition produces the habit.

One may get further light on this problem of training by considering the instinctive tendencies of the child as energies to be controlled by guidance, but never as wickedness to be crushed. The scientific point of view is specially practical and helpful in training these natural forces. It accepts what is, tries to make the best of it, and usually succeeds, whereas the narrowly traditional “moral” attitude, handed down to us from the Dark Ages, leads only too often to rebellion, often to secret rebellion, especially when applied to a lively and forceful child. For example, boxing, wrestling, and other com-

petitive sports among children are excellent opportunities for modifying the instinct of pugnacity and harnessing its energies to skilful control. I know of at least one school of small boys where clashes of will are never allowed to ferment and spoil relationships but are settled within a few hours by placing boxing gloves on the individuals involved in the quarrel, and giving them three rounds under the refereeship of a sympathetic master. After this the boys shake hands and go about their business with the emotional tension entirely relieved—an unmoral but very scientific and successful method.

Again, the instinct of gregariousness, that inherent tendency to be part of a group, can readily be taken advantage of for the purpose of better coöperation and the realization of responsibility to the group. By social experiment, preferably by the child's own experiment, he readily learns that it pays to coöperate and serve, and that to do so leads to a better place in the group, to more satisfying companionship, and even to leadership and praise. Thus group consciousness and interest are added to and modify the primitive gregariousness of the child.

When it comes to curiosity, this is the momentous opportunity for teachers and parents. It is the source of that ever-growing flood of "whys" that every normal child gives vent to, and it is the non-transferable job of elders to guide this wondering interest. But whatever means of satisfying curiosity they may finally adopt they should be very careful lest their own primitive annoyance leads them to attempt merely to choke the flood. I say attempt, for to choke it is impossible. The most strenuous efforts in that direction will accomplish but one thing and that a most regrettable one, for the current of curiosity will go on in spite of them, and refusal to satisfy it will simply cause it to seek satisfaction from a less desirable source. I would suggest, as an insurance, that special "why" times be established for younger children as part of the parental day's work.

The opportunity on the one hand, and the danger on the other, are particularly great when it comes to dealing with the mating instinct which, as is well known, often manifests itself first by curiosity. If a child is denied knowledge he is denied his right to be armed with under-

standing, and for what reason, except traditional repugnance of parents to dealing honestly with this question? However parents may rationalize their escape from responsibility the result will be the same, and they will have thrown away a golden chance of guidance, besides having risked the irreparable harm of unsatisfied curiosity being deflected to a presumably less desirable, probably extremely undesirable, source of satisfaction. The parents have then become, not indirectly but directly, responsible for misinformation, mystification, and the immoral vulgarization of one of the child's most important and difficult, not to say lifelong, problems. They should also beware of the orthodox "moral" attitude toward and method of dealing with this subject. To stigmatize the inevitable curiosity about sex as vulgar and thoughts about it as wicked, and then to admonish a child that it must keep its mind and heart pure and clean by excluding both this natural curiosity and all the thoughts and phantasies it engenders, under pain of punishment from high heaven, degradation, or even insanity, is not only of no possible help, when help is urgently needed, but

is a cowardly betrayal of the child's trust; for it not only adds the burden of an insoluble puzzle to his dilemma but at the same time, with the same blow, cuts him off from the most authoritative, natural, and accessible source of knowledge and help—his own parents. This method is often responsible for the formation of a most deformed attitude in the child which may last throughout life. So, according to their ability to understand, children should be given enough knowledge not only to answer adequately the questions they ask and to guide them in the present, but enough also to satisfy completely their curiosity to date. It is only necessary that the parents establish themselves as the most utterly satisfactory and desirable source of knowledge, in order that, from every point of view, even the moral, they may feel their children are safe. In short, I strongly advise treating this instinct as any other is or should be treated.

Another instinct-like tendency to be reckoned with and to be given full consideration is play. It takes care of itself at first, but later on it falls into grave danger not of too little attention but of too much. It should be modified only as

much as is absolutely necessary to avoid anti-social catastrophes. It cannot fulfil its function if it is oversuperintended, for it is the natural demand for vacation from the very discipline of superintendence and from the coercive effect of social life that the child's nature demands. It should be a recess in training and education. It should not be considered an opportunity for further training, for then it is no longer play and consequently loses its balancing recreative effect. Above all, play should not be used as a sugary coat to disguise the pill of work, for the function, technique, and object of each is totally different.

To confuse the two is to give the child a wrong idea of each, and tends to rob him both of the recreative benefits of play and of the inspiration of work. The child needs play in just the same way that adults need vacations from work but to a greater extent.

One of the harmful tendencies of modern life, it seems to me, is this tendency to oversuperintend play, to tell the child exactly what to do, when to do it, and how to do it; this coercive process obviously robs it of all spontaneity and freedom, chokes initiative, and frustrates curios-

ity and adventure, the very elements which make play play. There seems also to be too much superimposed entertainment offered the child not only in the matter of the already notoriously bad movies but even in the way children's books are now dressed up. As in the movies, so in the modern child's book, there is absolutely as little left to the imagination as is humanly possible. The movies entertain him in terms purely of sensuous excitement, fast and furious. They require no mental effort whatever on his part and absolutely no imagination. In the same way, instead of being given stories and fairy tales with very simple or no illustrations, thus allowing him to visualize and invent his own pictures (and I venture to say that they would be far more beautiful to him than those usually presented in the modern editions), he has thrust into his hands the over-illustrated modern child's book where every leaf and every blade of grass, every wrinkle, every mole, and every hair is drawn out for his benefit and to the stultification of his own creative imagination. In short, the modern child is not given sufficient opportunity to use his imagination, to create his own amusement, nor to follow

his own desires in play. Consequently, in spite of all that is so abundantly and hectically done for him, he exhibits in his life an actual lack of play, and in its place has a totally undesirable, abnormal, and intense demand for excitement and, furthermore, often a most unfortunate blasé attitude toward life.

The primitive instinctive response, that is, the most natural emotional reaction is, of course, to follow out the emotion in satisfying action and to do it at once. The primitive attitude toward pain is to avoid it and toward pleasure to seek it—the primitive category of all values being, of course, that of either pain or pleasure. One of the objectives in training children is to force this pain-pleasure category into at least second place. If they are to live happily and fully they must learn that, except in play and occasionally even then, distant satisfactions of a higher and more lasting order are definitely more profitable than the immediate and more evanescent satisfactions of pleasure attained or of pain avoided. They must be helped to learn that the ability to act according to expediency or according to ideal is of very much higher value to them, and

that it is something to be proud of as well. Of course, the by-product of this attitude—tolerance to pain and discomfort in the presence of a more important objective—comes only by experience and becomes habitual only through repetition. Example on the part of the parent, and the results of the child's own social experiments, simply interpreted, have a far greater effect in bringing about this revaluation of pain and pleasure, particularly in the early stages of development, than any didactic method such as so-called "moral" lecturing. The parent is normally the pattern, the exemplar of all that is most desirable in that blissfully anticipated state of being grown up—and so, naturally, to be imitated.

Self-control is too often made most unattractive in appearance by what seems to be a wrong conception of its real nature. It is generally made to appear to the child as a repressive process, as a series of painful though perhaps voluntary inhibitions; whereas it is quite likely that there really is no such thing as inhibition, that as a conception of neural activity it is mistaken, and the real key-note of self-control is choice. If

this be true, the first thing to teach the child is the fact that choice exists; second, that it is a power which he can exercise and that to do so is a grown-up and desirable privilege; all this he can learn better by experiment and deduction than by any other method. By repetition of satisfactory experiments he forms the habit of exercising choice. If he has been aided in making progressively wiser use of this power, then each choice that he has made has led to more profitable response and, when it has been made so repeatedly that it has become automatic, the necessity for choice is no longer necessary, for the desirable response has itself become a habit. In this way primitive response may be modified and the modifications made habitual, freeing choice for use on other and new opportunities for adaptation. Thus new fields for the child's intelligence to conquer are opened and its civilization progresses.

In speaking of training one can hardly avoid the use of the term discipline. It is, however, usually very loosely used; sometimes it occurs in the sense of moral training, sometimes the meaning is limited to that of drilling, and one of the

traditional definitions to be found in the dictionary is "edification by means of misfortune." Some people use the term merely as a synonym for training, but most, I think, give it somewhat of the dictionary meaning and picture it as a distinctly unpleasant and coercive process which they assume does some vague good in itself. This, I believe, is a mistake. Discipline in this narrower sense of the word cannot be considered a system, and certainly it is not an end in itself. At best, it is just one of the incidental qualities or by-products of training. The traditional belief in its unique virtue seems to be merely an inheritance from the Middle Ages, a relic, so to speak, of the times when to mortify the flesh was an accepted means of salvation, and pain in itself was considered a God-sent discipline not to be avoided under penalty of damnation. It is my belief that, if the other factors in training are cared for, discipline may be forgotten. Taking it in its most traditional and narrow sense, is there not enough of it in every single step of the process of adaptation? Can we not let the discipline of the results of conduct suffice, without setting artificial hardships in the child's way, let alone

inventing methods of adversity? Have we not given discipline all its due if we have seen to it that the child understands, in the first place, that his misconduct was due to poor theory, and secondly, that the so-called disciplinary measures are only the natural results of that misconduct? Surely the "misfortune" of misconduct needs no great artificial increment to be sufficiently edifying in the hands of a wise grown-up, especially if the latter's authority rests on wisdom and not on force.

Of course, authority is necessary in the administration of training and education. Particular care, however, should be taken that this authority very obviously rests, not on physical might, but upon the sympathetic understanding, responsibility, and greater knowledge of the parent or teacher.

In the methods they employ, whatever they may be, let the application be unemotional. Let it be as obviously as possible the result of thoughtful consideration, and lastly, let its purpose be clear and kept clear in the child's mind. Let there be no doubt, in short, that the whole process as well as the particular measure is purposed

to help toward a better adaptation and toward avoidance of future mishaps.

It seems to me that all methods of training should emphasize the pleasantness of the results of good conduct more than the painful results of misconduct. To this end, good results should be as lasting, attractive, and as permanent as possible, should be intimately associated with social profit, and should, further, be used to stimulate personal pride in the growing power of adaptation. When good results have been attained, to show parental pride and affection is helpful both as encouragement and because pride is contagious. On the other hand, in the face of frustration of our methods, to show the opposite emotion, anger, is decidedly inappropriate and obstructive. I should say that the worst method, without exception, is to assume the position of a vengeful Deity in the child's life and allow a punishment to be, or even seem to be, an expression of that Deity's anger. It is safe to say that this method will produce not the desired result but eventual disrespect, contempt, and even hatred for its author; it will certainly engender either pronounced fear and

deception or smouldering rebellion and righteous indignation on the part of the child, or, being suggestible, the child may then adopt the same method toward others of inferior strength to himself and shortly become a good imitation of the parental bully. Lastly, this unwise method, whether consciously or unconsciously assumed, may result in the tragedy of a broken relationship.

Let us now turn to the second artificially separated division of bringing up, namely, "education" which differs from training merely by the emphasis being on the mental rather than on the physical side. The original meaning of "education" is "to draw out or lead out," and so, combining our own with the original meaning, we may think of it as the process of drawing or leading out the mental capacity of the child. The ultimate object of this process, exactly like that of training, is to increase the child's power to be progressively useful by increasing his ability in adapting himself to the world as he finds it.

The business of education, then, has to do principally with increasing the power of adaptation through mental training, specifically, by

making the intelligence more effective. In short, its aim is to increase the child's ability to understand and, by understanding, to profit by experience. Because of what is perhaps man's greatest invention, written language, education does not confine itself merely to the increase of one's ability to understand one's own experiences but has at hand the experiences of countless others, and its job includes bringing the sum total of these recorded experiences into contact with the mind that it is training.

These countless experiences of others, recorded, summarized, analyzed, and finally understood, are what we call knowledge, knowledge of man and of his world. To educate a child is to help him to digest this material and to profit by it in his adaptations. The latent powers of the child's mind to which education is applied are, in the first place, his suggestibility and, dominating this more and more as he grows older, his intelligence. Early education depends largely on the child's uncritical acceptance of ideas, upon his power of primitive comprehension; whereas, later education should draw forth more and more his power of critical understanding. Throughout,

from kindergarten to college, his curiosity should be respected and stimulated and wisely trained to become the servitor of his critical faculties. To this end scientific, that is, honest, skeptical observation should be taught from the very first.

The specific job, then, of education is to bring these mental powers and the environmental materials together; in short, to teach the child how to learn and, next, to put him in touch with what to learn—namely, the already existing knowledge of his environment.

I think no one will dispute the statement that our present methods of education are faulty. There has been some progress all along the line, but the advance is still, perhaps necessarily, small and tentative; on the other hand, the possibilities of improvement, especially in primary education, seem relatively gigantic. In the first place, the objective of education does not, as yet, appear at all prominently in its methods. At least it is not yet obvious either to the child or to the non-professional onlooker, both of whom, I venture to say, find that the preparation for and passing of examinations still stand out as main objectives. That is why, perhaps, the fac-

ulty of memorizing, or that part of it which we know as "recalling" impressions, is so emphasized and why the fundamentally essential process of understanding seems to fall into relative neglect. It would seem, in other words, that mental gymnastics are still unduly stressed, and that clear, honest, skeptical thought is still a secondary issue.

Furthermore, it would seem that the present method of progression in education bears no close relationship to the normal stages of mental development in the child, which, as I have pointed out before, have an extraordinary similarity to the stages that the race has passed through. By our methods, from this point of view, children are skipped from infancy to old age, from middle life to youth, and so on, back and forth; or, from the racial point of view, they are skipped from a stage of eolithic culture to that of the Middle Ages, thence from the tribal standards of the early Hebrews to the wireless moment of the present and back again into Greek culture. This may be the best we can do, but I have sufficient temerity to suggest that far greater, swifter, and more orderly progress is possible. Indeed, I am

sufficiently perturbed and hopeful over the prospects of education to be ready to suggest possible improvements.

The first suggestion is that the acquirement of clear, straight, skeptical thinking shall be considered the primary purpose of education, shall be held as the prime objective from start to finish, all the time and without exception, and that subjects be considered, first, as material for this purpose, and second, purely in terms of their value to the problem of adaptation. I know of no more reliable mode of thought, no more unprejudiced approach to knowledge, no clearer, straighter, or more skeptical thought than that called "scientific." The scientific mode, furthermore, is the simplest. It depends in the first place upon observation—intelligent, curious observation. By observation, I mean, of course, not just looking, but seeing and thinking combined, the intelligent use of the special senses through which we are enabled to understand our environment. This type of thinking would seem entirely suitable for a child, because he is just "naturally" curious and observant, and needs only guidance to turn his curiosity into the service of his intelligence.

Indeed, there is hardly a teacher worthy of the name who does not know that curiosity is his greatest instinctive ally.

The second stage in the scientific mode is that of experiment; and what could be simpler and more appropriate than to turn the curiosity and imagination of the child into objective channels through simple experiments, thus linking observation to thought?

The third step is the most reasonable and probable explanation of the phenomena observed, namely, hypothesis. This is followed by further experiment, and finally the circle is completed by deductions, conclusions, and further tests. Thus each step of the scientific approach is linked constructively to the next, and the result is the clearest, most reliable knowledge obtainable.

I wish to submit that the kindergarten method, therefore, is an excellent beginning both in teaching the scientific mode of thought and also in meeting the needs of the stage of development with which it deals. Man first fumbled about in his environment, using his hand as the instrument of his intelligence, and the kindergarten

naturally and properly guides this process by applying to it the scientific mode of thought. It is an excellent beginning, but why abandon it so soon for the archaic methods so usually applied at the next stage? Why not carry on the training of the eye and brain and hand combined, why not cement the partnership so well begun between observation, imagination, understanding, and expression, and make solid these primal foundations upon which to build the later and more complex mental development? Why abandon the scientific mode of thought when it is so satisfactory at the beginning and when in all important matters in later life we must again have recourse to it? Why so soon lose sight of education's prime object—increased ability to understand man in his environment—the first step toward which the kindergarten has so successfully helped the child to take?

Perhaps it is mainly, if not only, tradition that prevents this suggested evolution of education. We seem to have inherited from the scholastic age a division not only of labour but of interests in the different departments of education which,

though modernized, still somewhat resemble the guilds of old, and still exhibit much the same divisional jealousies as the carpenters', plumbers', and other modern trade unions. These divisions are of course to a certain extent useful, as specialization is 'necessary for research and to a certain extent obviously for teaching. However, that the division of labour should also entail a division of interests does not seem necessary or wise. Certainly the division should not be obvious, let alone marked, or, worst of all, insuperable to the learning child. From this point of view, it would seem that the method of selling the child bits of unrelated information in air-tight packages is hardly wise, for we know there is no such thing as a separate bit of knowledge; there are only separate bits of information which are quite useless, save as integral parts making up the whole which only becomes knowledge through the integration of its parts. Furthermore, there can hardly be any knowledge that is not of man and his environment, nor any useful knowledge that does not directly or indirectly aid man in his struggle for adaptation.

It is therefore suggested that the old tradi-

tional divisions, such as geography and history, be made as inconspicuous as possible, that, indeed, they should be dealt with, as such, to any great extent, only by and among specialists. It is further suggested that a continuous programme of synthetic teaching is essential to bind the necessary explanatory analyses together as knowledge, and to make this knowledge applicable to life. Greater care should be given to the coördination of information, and to this end it might be well to establish an all-embracing department of, or course in, integration.

Furthermore, if the scientific method of observation, hypothesis, experiment, and conclusion be the method by which the most reliable and satisfactory knowledge is attained, this method should be the one used and also the mode of thought taught. The kindergarten method of hand and brain training is, as already mentioned, eminently fitted to the child's early educational needs, for its methods and aims can be readily suited to each stage of the child's development, from the pre-savagery of infancy to the barbarism of youth. It is, at the same time, perfectly consonant with the scientific mode of thought

and procedure, and develops the use of the special senses at present so wastefully neglected in later education. Therefore, I venture to suggest that hand and brain training should be continued without interruption throughout at least preliminary and perhaps even through collegiate education. There seems to be reason to believe that these methods would develop accurate observation, unprejudiced deduction, and constructive thinking, and that they are applicable to all subjects, even to those now considered most abstruse and difficult.

To be specific, I suggest that it would be appropriate to begin a child's education by teaching him something of his environment in terms of astronomy. The constructive methods of the kindergarten are certainly applicable to it. History, geography, and geology are closely related and could be introduced as not too conspicuous subdivisions of the primary subject, and in their midst biology, zoölogy, anthropology, and sociology would provide the natural bits of information which the child's curiosity would demand, and through which his training would naturally proceed. In this plan mathematics would have a

place only as a method of quick and accurate thought applied to every phase of this knowledge-seeking progress, whatever its formal subdivision might be. The same could be true of language, if it were historically taught. One would naturally proceed from the beginning of language, as a form of communication by sound and gesture, to the articulate word, and then as split into racial, tribal, and national tongues. Indeed, language might be taught safely and fully from the historical point of view and then as an inseparable part of many other subjects. Perhaps the traditional subdivision, history, might even be made the all-embracing mother of them all. The history of man's environment would include astronomy, geology, biology, and all such related information; and this, combined with the history of man himself, would mean the study in an orderly and consecutive manner of all his significant adaptations to his environment, as well as his developments, biological, social, mechanical, and cultural. Such a resynthesis of information would not only make possible but would actually involve the constant application of the acquired knowledge to the child's

own everyday life. Thus the main object of education would not only be kept constantly in sight but would be actually attained—better adaptation and thus greater usefulness.

One rather large and important type of information which I have not mentioned is usually labelled “æsthetics.” Appreciation of the beautiful in form, in colour, in sound, or in motion can and should be an inconspicuous though constant element in early education which presents ample opportunities for training the imagination and developing the æsthetic sense. It certainly needs no separate department until well along in the college training, if at all. That is why I have not brought this branch into our present discussion, which deals only with primary training and education.

I am often asked: “How about religious education and training?” My answer is: “Let it be honest above all things.” If by training we mean to accomplish habits of thought, let honesty be the habit. If by training we mean the inculcation of belief in dogma, I should say: “Beware lest you be yielding to that desire to make others, especially your children, like you, or,

in this case, believe as you do." Religious education, on the other hand, has no such danger if it is pursued as one would pursue any other subject germane to education. In which case, all religions, not just the Christian religion, would naturally be considered from a historical point of view before the complex but far less significant subject of later sects and movements within Christianity. Then, when it came to specific beliefs in this or that dogma, in this or that miracle, the parent or teacher would be in a position to be not only honest but most informing. By honest, I mean the honesty we should practise in all teaching when we differentiate between what we ourselves may happen to believe to be true and what others believe to be true, between what we have been *told* has happened and what we have witnessed or observed. For instance, if a child is told: "Mr. Smith walked past the house to-day," it is not an honest statement if it is based only on hearsay. In the latter case, obviously, the only honest statement would be: "I heard or have been told Mr. Smith passed the house to-day," or "So-and-so said Mr. Smith," etc. Now if the child asks, "Well, do you *believe*

it?" then in all honesty you can reply, "Yes, because So-and-so has always told me the truth," or: "Yes, because I have faith in So-and-so." The child might then ask: "Does everybody believe it?" Then again honesty requires the reply: "No, not everyone; indeed many do not believe it." "Are those others stupid people, or bad people, or ignorant people?" the child might well inquire, and if honesty is still to lead the way, the answer will probably have to be: "No. People, many people, many intelligent people, many intelligent and very good people do not believe it, but something quite different," or "quite similar," as the case may be.

When teaching history, as such, we do not say: "So-and-so happened at such and such a time. You must believe it or be eternally damned." On the contrary, not only do we not resent the child's questioning any such didactic statement but we encourage it to accept historical fact only on valid evidence, and actually urge upon it other probable or possible interpretations of any so-called "fact" of history; thus, we leave it free to use intelligent choice and by using it to develop its own power of understanding and

penetration. So, if a child asks, referring to some miracle: "Did this really happen?" we should be at least as honest as we are in other teaching and say: "Really, I do not know, but this or that is the evidence, and some people interpret it this way, some that." If finally the child asks: "Well, do *you* believe?" then the parent or teacher can reply with a perfectly honest "Yes" or "No" and give reasons for his belief, which again must be honest. For instance, if a child asks: "Why are you an Episcopalian?" In nine cases out of ten, the honest answer would be: "Because I was brought up to be one, and I was brought up thus because my father, or my mother, was an Episcopalian," not "Because I believe it to be the best, or the most intelligent, or the most authoritative sect." As a matter of fact, sect is, with very few exceptions, purely a social accident and not the outcome of deliberate, let alone searching, thought.

If religion were taught on broader, more historical lines, and if the ethical principles involved were stressed in its practical application to everyday life and were the one great underlying dogma of God emphasized as the only one

of transcendent importance, would there not soon be as large a percentage of Christians actually living Christianity as there now are Mohammedans, Hindoos, or Buddhists living according to their lights? Also, if religion were so taught, would not children, as they grow and learn by means of education to think, have less difficulty in reconciling their knowledge and experience with their religious beliefs, and therefore, would there not be fewer who later in life utterly discard religion as irrelevant and childish?

On the whole, it seems to me that these proposed changes in object and method of education, despite all the difficulties and imperfections they obviously present, are, at least in principle, more appropriate to the child's needs and nature, better tuned to our ultimate objective of adaptation in terms of usefulness to civilization, than our present method which, in contrast, seems still to be strangely marked by artificial dislocation and disorientation. I am fully aware that one or more of these suggested improvements are even now being given tentative trial in a very few schools here and there. However, these experimental innovations are yet rare. They la-

bour under the severe handicap of the still pretty rigid college entrance requirements, and are still opposed by ancient scholastic traditions. It is only through the enlightened opinion and demand of parents that primary education can be kept from reactionary freezing, and its progress is, therefore, their responsibility just as much as that of the teacher.

I need hardly say that these suggestions do not come from one who is expert in formal education. Frankly they bear the bias of psychiatric experience and therefore are to be considered as coming from one who deals with the results of training rather than with the training itself. Biased as they may be, however, they are inspired by an abiding faith in the educability of man and an insistent hope of seeing great improvement in all matters of mental and physical training. This hope is further illumined by the belief that, through improvements in our methods of early training and education, many of the maladaptations in later life so disastrous to happiness and, unfortunately, so common in this stage of man's progress toward a higher civilization may ultimately be avoided.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BALANCED LIFE

The Necessity for Work—The Rewards of Mastery—Selecting a Life Work—Wealth? Convenience? Interest?—The Normal Life Needs Play—Play for the Housewife—Cultivate a Hobby—The Wisdom of Rest and Leisure—Fitness as a Foundation—Elasticity in the Passing Years—Appropriate Balance—How Shall We Meet Middle Age?—The Grown-Up Family—Understanding More Valuable Than Emotion

TO PREVENT maladaptation in adult life when formal education, as such, is over, or, better, to insure the progress of adaptation after education has ceased, is largely a matter of living intelligently. If education has failed in what is or should be its objective, then reëducation is the remedy. If education has left the sensitive, intelligent citizen-in-the-making still ignorant

both of himself and of his fellow citizens, then the remedy lies in giving him this essential knowledge as rapidly and fully as possible. But this is not a treatise on psychotherapy, so we shall not discuss this educative process called in psychotherapy "reëducation," but confine ourselves to the more positive and more purely preventive, rather than corrective, aspects of the problem which faces every well-informed, well-endowed, and well-intentioned adult; namely, how to live more usefully and therefore more happily, more skilfully and therefore more pleasantly. This is really a matter of living, as I have said, intelligently, and progressively more intelligently, the result being that much-desired balanced life.

By a balanced life we usually mean one in which the physical and mental activities are nicely balanced or, if we happen to be thinking a bit more deeply, a life that also exhibits a good balance between the serious and the frivolous, between its work and its play. Both of these balances are of indubitable importance, and, if we may add one or two other points, I believe we can construct not only a clear but a faithful

picture of the kind of life which is most apt to succeed, most apt to be happy, and least liable to breaks in progress, let alone serious maladaptations. The other things that my experience has taught me to rank as of at least equal importance with physical health, work, and play, are rest, leisure, and contemplation. So the items that I would include in my conception of a balanced life would be work, play, rest, leisure, contemplation and, last but not least, physical fitness.

Each one of these may be considered a form of activity requiring a technique of its own. If these activities are in mutual equipoise and are pursued, each one, with intelligent technique, the result, according to my observations, is a balanced life, progressive, successful, and happy.

Work is obviously the first essential of a satisfactory life because it is the process of usefulness; and usefulness is not only what civilization demands of its members, but it is also the only way in which that insistent drive to be of importance to our fellow man can be constructively and happily satisfied. Work is purposive effort, effort guided toward an objective, and to be

satisfying it must not only be measurably successful in attaining the objective, but the objective itself must meet with the worker's approval. Whether work is in itself pleasant or unpleasant, difficult or easy, is beside the point, these are all widely varying secondary characteristics of it, but its essential characteristic is objectiveness, objectiveness to which the worker holds himself responsible. Indeed, from this point of view, may we not say with complete truth that work is marked above all things by responsibility? Is it not responsible, objective striving for an approved end that differentiates work from play, from rest, or any other activity, and which makes it the nucleus and *raison d'être* of a civilized life? Like art, then, it must have its objective, approved by the artist, and, in service of this objective, its technique. The more nearly and obviously these two items are associated the better. For instance, in the profession of nursing, the immediate object of relieving the pain of the patient is precisely the same as the general object of relieving suffering in general. The immediate object is in this case identical with the general, a little piece of it in fact, and both the immediate

and the general object so closely connected with every smallest step of the technique that there is little liability of the worker losing sight of the objective, nor of the technique becoming an end in itself. In contrast, how much more difficult it is to keep the ethical objective of a complicated, prolonged, and often harassing business procedure clearly before one's mind and so prevent the technique, which involves so much of dollars and cents, from becoming an object in itself. I should say that the first and most important and often most difficult step in developing the best technique of work is to define clearly its object and, in so defining it, to determine without compromise whether it is a satisfactory one or not. As an obvious example, is the object of the ancient profession of stealing satisfactory, or is that of bootlegging better or worse? Is the objective of digging ditches, of manufacturing armchairs, or of lending money to individuals or industries preferable? The technique of selling may be precisely the same whether one is selling something useful and beneficial to the purchaser or something useless and harmful, but the object in each case is totally

different. One objective would satisfy; the other would either have to be hidden from the public and disguised from one's self, or acknowledged with dissatisfaction if not with shame.

To keep clear the ultimate as well as the immediate object of one's work is of paramount importance from the standpoint of ethical satisfaction, but to do so has also a very practical engineering value, for certainly, to insure the efficiency as well as the efficacy of our efforts the technique of any job must be appropriate, first and foremost, to its immediate and then to its ultimate objective.

For instance, if your object is to drive a nail you pick an appropriate tool—a hammer, and use it according to a technique which has proved successful in driving nails. Just so, if your objective is to explain a problem in arithmetic to a child, your objective at once fixes the technique as that of explanation to such and such a mental age, and you certainly would not willingly use a method designed either to discourage, puzzle, or infuriate the child. And so, if the purpose of your work is the advancement of science, or adding to this person's welfare, or to the good of mankind,

the formulation of that purpose and keeping it clear in spite of threatened confusion will go far toward guiding your efforts and keeping them from perhaps being sidetracked by some irrelevant emotional impulse. A strong desire for self-expression or an impulse of self-protection may creep in and supplant the original purpose of the job if one is not on watch. If this happens it will, of course, sooner or later affect the technique disastrously, for such errant impulses obviously require for themselves a very different technique from that required by the job.

In the first place, then, the purpose of work must be satisfactory, the technique must be suitable to this purpose, and in order to maintain this suitability it is important that the purpose be kept clear. After that the more specific and detailed, or one might say vocational, items of work may be considered. For instance, any job, from bricklaying to painting portraits, has its own particular technique. The professional differs from the amateur in having mastered this technique. It may require not hours, nor months, but years of persistent and often boring labour to acquire this mastery, but it is the absolutely

essential foundation of freedom of expression, and is absolutely necessary to progressive accomplishment. Here again clearness of objective is of great assistance. Many times regularity of practice, especially of the primary details of technique, like finger exercises on the piano, or the necessity of acquiring rudimentary knowledge uninteresting in itself, is discouraging, boring, and may even turn a potential artist aside from his objective. Then it is that sharpening his awareness of the purpose of the technique, recrystallizing and strengthening the ultimate purpose of his art will lend inspiration and may gild with reflected interest even the dullest bits of technique. If the detail is not of interest in itself, if it does not in itself inspire, it still is part of the greater whole, a stepping stone, a means to the desired end, and, last but not least, it is a challenge to the courage of the worker and to his loyalty. Thus losing sight of it may be fatal to technique, whereas recrystallizing it and renewing his allegiance to it may be the very thing to insure success.

The mastery of technique depends not only on perfecting each of its acts but upon repeating

these acts until they become automatic. Thus mental as well as manual habits are formed, and once being established as habits they require no further thought but constitute the reliable and automatic foundation of a technique upon which future improvement and progress may be built. It is the repetition of desirable acts appropriate to its purpose which is the essential process of the technique of work.

In much the same way regularity is a most desirable, perhaps necessary, characteristic of the technique of work. We are creatures of habit, and most of our physiological and mental processes function in a more or less regular way. There is a rhythm or a tendency to rhythm—daily, monthly, and seasonal—in our physical affairs. We rest, sleep, and eat at about the same time each twenty-four hours; therefore we expect to sleep, we grow sleepy, we want to eat, and grow hungry somewhat through anticipation at about the same time each day. Much valuable time is saved by fitting our plans into this rhythmic swing. We do not have to decide when to eat, when to sleep; nor, moreover, do we have to waste time and energy in arranging each day

with our friends and associates so that our habits of rest and eating may fit in with theirs, for they, too, have already adopted a similar rhythm. So it is with work. If we habitually work at certain times, we expect to work, and are more or less automatically prepared and mobilized for that activity when the proper time comes around. All the little automatic processes of technique are set in motion without any effort wasted in deciding when, where, and how; in short, through force of habit alone, almost without conscious effort we find ourselves at work.

To have regular habits of work and to have office hours set exclusively for work is essential to the highest type of professional accomplishment. It is not, as the amateur æsthete would have us believe, a stultifying bondage. He scorns regularity and depends on what he calls "inspiration." He must feel like work before he can work. He confesses, albeit with pride, that he is unable to work unless his emotions are in such and such a state, unless the weather is thus and so, unless his senses are stimulated or soothed by this or that; in short, he confesses to a rigid bondage of limitations and, worse than that,

accepts no responsibility whatever toward them. Since emotions are totally unreliable and irregular he, being totally dependent upon them, is likewise totally unreliable and irregular. The intelligently regulated life of the professional, on the contrary, knows no such limitations. He holds himself responsible for using his technical ability when and how he chooses, and he has chosen to work at such times as best suit his needs. The working hour comes and he works. Repetition produces habit, and the result is that he gets full benefit from the momentum of rhythm in his working life as well as always greater power to work and work well despite contrary emotional weather. This developed and habitual ability to work stands him in good stead, for even though his emotions on occasion happen not to be particularly suitable or agreeable just before he works, they, too, are subject to habit, and after he begins to work they, too, fall into working order; whereas, on those rare days when his emotions happen to be especially finely tuned to the job he gets a quality and strength of inspiration which the amateur could never know or, even if he knew, could never possess

the technical ability to use fully. The professional, then, whose work is planned and regular, produces better work, and in the long run a much greater quantity of work, than the irregularly living and irregularly working amateur.

The very practical importance of both purpose and technique is brought out very clearly, when they are given due consideration, in the process of selecting among all the possibilities what is to be the work of one's life. Many are driven by necessity to take whatever presents itself as a means of livelihood, but later on often even they will find opportunity to exercise choice. Whether it be the first opportunity or the last, where there is choice the first matter to settle is which of all these possible jobs is, from the purposive point of view, the most satisfactory. The ultimate purpose of this one is to grow rich, of this one to gain power of another sort, of that one to be of service to mankind in this or that way. First, which of these purposes satisfies your ideal of service for yourself? Perhaps, and most probably, several do and several do not. Those that do not are then eliminated, and you have to choose between those jobs which have successfully met

your first test—purpose. Let us suppose there are four or five that have survived: among these there will be found a variety and perhaps great differences in technique. Eliminate those for which you feel your particular abilities unsuited or for which you have good reason to believe your personal make-up is unsuitable. On the other hand, choose among the surviving jobs those to which you feel yourself particularly suited both emotionally and in terms of potential or already developed technical ability. Let us now suppose that the choice has narrowed down to two or three jobs, each satisfactory as to purpose, each equally suitable to one's personality and ability. All other things being equal, one would naturally choose the most available. By available I mean not only geographically available, but socially and economically as well—the one, in short, requiring the least monetary, social, or personal sacrifice on the part of anyone concerned. But suppose all these points have been settled and there still remains a choice, then there is a very important matter, partly of suitability, partly of efficiency, partly of pleasure, still to be considered most carefully and respectfully, for

upon it the whole issue may hang. It is this: What kind of a personal, intimately personal, life does this job offer? Do I prefer to live in a city, where I can have this or that and where I must do thus and so, or in the country? Does this job, within itself, bring me more in contact with books, with apparatus, or with human lives, and which of these do I like the most? With this job as the working nucleus of life, what about the rest of life? Does it, with its hours and places of work, afford the opportunity of playing as I like to play, of taking excursions into the unreal and ideal, such as concerts, picture galleries, or other hobbies of mine of that sort? And last but not least, does this or that job offer companionship in work? Will my fellow workers be satisfactory companions in arms? Of the jobs surviving the first test, then choose the one which as nearly as you can tell satisfies and pleases you emotionally, socially, and personally. In short, choose the job which affords the kind of life you like and want to live, in terms not only of work but also of play, rest, leisure and, last but not least, of companionship.

If work is essential to a useful and therefore happy life, so is play, for without it life would not be balanced and could not in the long run be either as productive or as happy. To work for an ultimate objective the fruition of which cannot occur within the span of one's life does not come naturally or easily to man. Responsibility is an acquired attitude. To hold one's self responsible for the welfare of others rather than to seek one's own selfish salvation is, to say the least, a very difficult attitude to acquire and, at best, can become only semi-habitual. Every child, under the discipline of school, needs a recess; every soldier, under the discipline of the army, needs his furloughs. One of our naval officers of olden times put this most succinctly when he said: "The most effective preventive against mutiny is shore leave." In civil life, indeed in all civilized as contrasted with primitive life, this is true. Man must have periods when he is unharnessed from his responsibilities, when he can express his natural primitive self spontaneously and with as little restraint of discipline as the welfare of his fellows may permit. Play functions, as I under-

stand it, as irresponsible effort, effort that is expended for the very pleasure of expending it. It is activity without any ulterior purpose, its only object being the pleasure it gives to the player. Men who have not only confessed but actually boasted to me that they have taken no vacation for ten or even twenty years have pridefully explained that they took so much pleasure in their work that it was play to them and that, therefore, they needed no vacation. These very men, however, were invariably suffering from lack of play, as manifested by the dead level of their seriousness, their tenseness, and their emotional staleness. They took not only their jobs but themselves too seriously; they were so constantly responsible that their seriousness and their responsibility overshadowed their whole lives, choked their spontaneity, crushed out the thousand and one little pleasant, assuaging, intimate, and playful things, which give life grace and ease and beauty, and under this unconsciously accumulating and unrelieved burden they had broken down. Their plight had become ultimately the same as that of some others who tried to make play, to the exclusion of work, the

whole of life. Unbalance in both cases was the cause of failure. The exclusive players had finally made work of play and failed; the exclusive workers had thought they had made play of work, and they failed. Both had failed to continue to succeed. There can, of course, be play in work, in so far as the process of work may be and often is pleasurable in itself. The successful expenditure of energy always does give pleasure. But the processes of work, no matter how pleasant, are always overshadowed by responsibility, are always aimed toward the yet unattained objective, and, therefore, always bear in themselves some degree of anxiety, some degree of doubt as to the outcome, some of the impatience, perhaps, which every traveller on the road experiences, and work is therefore always fraught with some of the emotional strain with which man must ever react to responsibility.

Play, unlike work, must not be too closely regulated lest it become like work. The opportunity for play, of course, should be planned for, because if it is not part of the scheme of life it will be crowded out by those extra side issues re-

lated to the daily routine, especially to work, which are so apt to present themselves as new opportunities for more work and which are always the natural outcome of successful work. In modern times this is particularly true, for the great temptation of the modern worker is to try to do five days' work in one. Ambition, competition, as well as the numberless mechanical helps of modern life which have well-nigh eliminated space and have cut the time element at least in two, contribute enormously to this temptation. These siren opportunities call, and the worker, especially the young worker, answers. He is elastic, has great reserves of strength, and accomplishes the extra tasks with success, with great satisfaction, and without any apparent ill effects. He is young, he absorbs the strain and he thinks of play, if he thinks of it at all, as merely postponed until this or that task has been accomplished. The next extra task of the endless series, however, soon overlaps the old one, and so it goes on. Being young, it is all right for a time, but being a creature of habit he unfortunately gets used to the abnormal playless life, and the results of such a life being slow to make them-

selves felt, particularly in the presence of ever-growing satisfaction and ever-increasing ambition, it is not till some gross failure of his physical apparatus or a serious mental or emotional reaction commands attention that the apparently upward but really downward course is checked. I believe it is largely because in this country we are production crazy, worshipping quantity rather than quality, and therefore having relatively no interest in play except when it can be made to yield more opportunity, that so many of our men are not only old but ancient at fifty. If a man had played as hard as the average successful American works, if he had played as immoderately or eaten or smoked or drunk as immoderately, we would not wonder at his being a wreck at fifty. There is even less wonder that the immoderate and playless worker is so often a burned-out candle at middle age. It is rather a greater wonder that he is not always dead by then.

Play is as much a necessity of normal life as sugar is necessary to a normal diet. It cannot be postponed for a decade and then taken up, for it is a daily necessity. One cannot eat only meat

for one month, bread for another, and only sweets the third and call it a balanced diet, let alone expect thereby to maintain normal digestion and nutrition; yet men often plan to work hard and exclusively till, say, fifty or sixty and then retire and play the rest of their lives. It is a pitiful mistake they make, for when they retire they find that the sole ability they have left is for work—the one they have exercised all their lives, and that their ability for play, so long neglected, has left them for good and all. The so-called play they attempt is just work in another form; they feel they ought to play, they have earned the right to play, they must play, but still they cannot. It has become to them a lost art. It has never been part of their daily working life, it has never had its proper place in the weekly, let alone yearly, plan, and now when it has the field all to itself it is a paralyzed function. It would have been the same had they played all their lives till fifty or sixty and then tried to live on work exclusively. Work would have become a lost art. The fact is, one must go to school to play hooky, one must be a worker to play properly, and, equally, one must play to work properly.

Work and play together balance life, one feeds the other. They are mutually necessary, neither can be neglected for long in favour of the other without causing serious unbalance and, furthermore, finally destroying the other.

There is a popular belief that people "break down nervously" exclusively because of too much play and too little or no work. This is a prejudice and, like most prejudices, is based on ignorance. As a matter of fact, in such cases the unbalance is almost always in favour of work. In my own experience, for instance, there have been some thirty exclusive workers who have broken down to every one non-working player, and it has always clearly been the unbalance between work and play that has done the mischief. There is a very important characteristic of play which it shares with art. Each is a jealous mistress. Wherefore time, when it is given to play, must be given whole-heartedly and exclusively. No hedging is allowable. To seek even a little profit or a little gain ulterior to play will ruin it. The man who tries to profit by his play is a professional player, for profit inevitably becomes a motive whether he plays baseball, tennis, cards,

or golf. The man who in no way intends to be a professional player and yet tries to sneak in a bit of profit is just foolish, for he fools himself into losing the one profit he needs—refreshment.

Play is an item that one finds neglected even more in the average woman's life than in the average man's. The married woman's work is outwardly so apparently unlike work, being so intimately connected with social activities and with the play as well as the work of the children, that her need of vacation is only rarely recognized. The average family goes on its vacation, or it would be more accurate to say that it goes on the man's vacation. He leaves his office behind him, he enjoys not only a change of scene and social contact but a total relief from the daily effort and responsibility of his job. The children are out of school and under the best natural conditions give themselves up to play, pure and simple. On the other hand, a woman simply transfers her job from one locus to another; the husband's comfort and indeed his vacation enjoyment are part of her job. She still has him as a responsibility and as an important objective of her daily efforts. She still

has the children's health, pleasure, and safety to watch over just as she did at home. House-keeping is the same old grind. That is another unchanged part of her job, unchanged save that now she has to do it under greater difficulties than she did in the city. In short, the family vacation is splendid for every single member except herself, and for her, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, it is not a vacation at all—just a change of scenery. On the other hand, she, because of the very nature of her job, which is constant duty made up of numberless and nameless details without office hours and subject to many other people's more or less inevitable wants and demands, needs a vacation more than the man with his well-regulated hours and strict closing time. It is all very well to say that women could and should regulate their work so as to have office hours, time off for rest, etc. True, but the fact remains that the vast majority of women do not and many cannot so regulate their jobs, and even if they did, they would still be at least in as great need of regular vacations as their husbands. Unless the family plans definitely include a vacation for the woman, apart from the family, and

unless she also sees to it that her daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly allowance of play and rest is maintained, she will follow the usual routine of plugging away till she gets too tired, too stale to be able to play. Frequently, it is only then that the necessity is recognized and, instead of an enjoyable, youth-conserving vacation, she has to take an enforced, none too agreeable, none too satisfactory substitute—some sort of rest cure. Instead of the refreshment and play she so much needed, she gets built up, somewhat rested, and goes back to her job again only to repeat the same old cycle.

Hobbies are playlike activities and should be cultivated not only for themselves but for the future, when they may be sorely needed. They are not quite pure play if they are very good hobbies, but, rather, interesting and absorbing avocations with no important responsibility attached. They have objectives of their own, ulterior to the prime objective of play, but these ulterior objectives must not be considered responsibilities, else the hobby rides the man rather than he the hobby, and it then threatens to become his work. In their intermediate rela-

tion between work and play hobbies are of great value to the balance of life. By widening the cultural and intellectual horizon, developing wider interests, and cultivating dormant abilities, they prevent the concentrated and specialized worker from becoming narrowed by his work and perhaps losing his power of artistic enjoyment. The man with a beloved hobby has always something to look forward to, for a hobby is never finished—the collection is never complete; the best stream has not yet been fished; there is always something else to see or to read or for the amateur to learn how to do.

Last but not least, the working citizen who possesses a hobby is never bored, never out of a job, and enjoys his rainy days; finally, when old age curtails his other activities, he is still happily, and in a broad sense profitably, occupied.

Rest is a part or, if you please, an activity of life which is in contrast both to work and play. It is totally unlike both of them in that it is characterized by the absence of voluntary effort. Indeed, it is very different from either, and the very antithesis of work, being marked by a total

absence of responsibility. Neither physiologically nor mentally is it inactivity, for all of the functions of the body go on quite busily during rest. Even during sleep this is true, and even in that state the mind continues to function. Complete rest is a sort of irresponsible automatic functioning of the mind-body machine characterized by the absence of voluntary movements and of any effort to control either the body or the stream of thought. In rest the body is relaxed and the mind wanders, that is, it dreams. At certain times, unless interfered with, this condition turns automatically into sleep. The resting person never suffers from insomnia. Regularly recurring, irresponsible rest is as necessary to bodily and mental health as is regulated and purposive activity. One of the most important functions of play is to prepare the workers for rest by relieving those combinations of higher brain centres which have been employed in work by using totally different ones—just as the best form of muscular exercise is that in which the muscles are alternately contracted and relaxed, i. e., worked and rested. Every living animal, especially that strenuous animal, man, must have suffi-

cient rest in every twenty-four hours to re-establish equilibrium between waste and repair. The amount of rest required by each individual varies, but the average working man or woman with an output, say, of eight hours' work needs nearly if not quite that amount of rest every twenty-four hours. It need not all be in sleep, for in this requirement normal people vary greatly, but about that amount of time free from responsibilities and voluntary exertion seems to be a necessary allowance, if life and health and usefulness are to be measured in decades rather than in days or weeks. This I have found to be the average need, but it varies not only with the quantity of work done but also, and most markedly, with the quality of the rest obtained. Some people take an hour or two to begin resting; others rest at once, as soon indeed as the harness of work drops off. This is largely a matter of technique. Some people do not know how to rest; others do. Those who do not may easily learn the art. Suffice it to say here that this art depends in the first place upon understanding what rest is and then giving one's self absolutely up to it without thought of profiting

in any other way during the time given to it. Like play, rest is jealous. If you have given a time to it, do not attempt to inject amusement or anything else into that time. "Write" the time "off," as a bookkeeper might say. Give yourself completely to rest and let it take care of you.

There is a restlike state, related to rest very much as hobbies are related to play, which is markedly conspicuous by its absence in most American lives. It is leisure. If you or I should see a man sitting quietly doing nothing, we would think, I'll warrant, of only two possible explanations: either there is something the matter with him or he is waiting for someone. In either case we would feel sorry for him, and yet there is a third improbable possibility, for he may be a very unusually wise man who, possessing leisure, is enjoying it in quiet contemplation. He is not working, he is not playing, and perhaps he is not exactly resting: he is merely at leisure. Contemplation, of course, presupposes leisure; that is, time in which there is nothing to do, for which there is nothing planned, and from which nothing is expected. Perhaps that is why contempla-

tion—"inviting one's soul"—is so rare in crowded occidental life and is such a thoroughly accepted part of the Oriental. However that may be, opportunity to think restfully of the larger aspects of life, of their relative values and worth—metaphorically, or really lying on one's back under an apple tree—to forget one's self and wonder about the stars, the clouds, growing things, the antiquities, man's little place in the universe, is a wholesome, rebalancing, normalizing thing to do. It is like slipping out of one's place in the jostling, blindly struggling crowd to climb up on some eminence whence one can see a bit more clearly at least in what direction, if not why, the crowd is pushing. To do this requires leisure, an unsold and unsalable balance of time; besides, if the crowded overlapping of things and thoughts in life is undesirable, there is no better or more profitable method of prevention than adopting leisure as an antidote. Just as sawdust or cotton is used to pack articles safely for transport, so should there be leisure packed between engagements, between parts of the job, between work and play, and between work and rest. All other things being equal, the person with leisure,

especially if he be wise enough to use it as such, lives the longest and most usefully, for he is least liable to false values and to unconsidered and wastefully hurried acts. Through wise planning he has left himself time for leisure and has used it—at times in wondering and in contemplation, at times for a bit of extra rest or play, but rarely has he sacrificed it to work. Through the acquirement of leisure, the income of time in such a life is elastic. It has a balance for emergency use, in place of the deficit characteristic of the hurried life. He has also given leisure an honourable place in the company of work, play, and rest; has added a quiet, thoughtful partner to the firm, who enhances the function of each of the others and brings efficiency and harmony to the whole. Leisure is the friend of efficiency, for surely where leisure is hurry cannot be, and hurry is the chief destroyer of efficiency. Leisure is the opportunity for quiet, retrospective, prospective, and imaginative contemplation. It is the very process which weighs values, looks upon life from a bird's-eye point of view, and thus tends to synthesize experience into a harmonious whole. He who lives fully and still has

leisure has indeed planned wisely, for through his wisdom he has gained much and has lost nothing.

Whatever else is desirable, or whatever may help to make life full and happy, it must not be forgotten that physical fitness is the very foundation requirement of all. Even from the most intellectual point of view, bodily condition is of the utmost importance. The intellectual, too, often thinks of his brain as something quite independent of his body, quite outside the rules of physical hygiene, and therefore he often lives and takes a certain foolish pride in living an unhealthy life. As a matter of cold fact, quite the opposite is true, for the brain is not only very much a member of the family of organs but, of this family, it is both the most important member and the one most sensitive to physical conditions. It is nourished by the same blood as all the other organs, it is affected more or less acutely by every change of function in every other organ and, therefore, its functional normality depends absolutely and constantly upon functional normality of these fellow organs. Physical hygiene in regard to sufficient and regular bodily rest, sufficient and regular bodily exercise, and a

regular and well-balanced diet, suited both in quality and quantity to the other items of the physical and mental life, is quite as essential to mental health, to right thinking, and to progressive success in life as is mental sanity itself. Indeed, a life which is well balanced as to food, rest, and exercise, which exhibits regularity in these as well as in other bodily habits, and in which one finds "all things in moderation," is a wise life—the product, we can be quite sure, of an intelligent brain in fine working order.

From the physical point of view, there is another factor that deserves especial attention, and that is sunlight. Modern life tends to be so thoroughly protected from the elements that modern man, through the sunlit hours of the day, is apt to be so entirely sheltered by roofs and walls that he is deprived of practically all sunshine. Dwellers in a big city like New York get little or no direct sunshine during the winter months and precious little during the rest of the year. This is partly because the atmosphere of smoke and dust filters out so much of it, partly because the buildings are so high that they cut off the sunlight from each other as well as from

the streets below, and partly because the city dweller spends almost all of his days housed in his apartment or his office. Even going from one to the other he is quite as badly off, as far as lack of sunshine is concerned, under the roof of a closed car. The sunny room or office is very pleasant and sunny *looking* but, as far as affording its occupants any benefit from sunlight is concerned, it is a fraud. Ordinary window glass excludes practically all the sun's so-called "actinic rays" which bronze the skin and, through their action on the superficial capillaries, profoundly and beneficially affect the blood and, through it, the whole bodily condition. It is the absence of these rays which can be held in no little degree responsible for the anæmic pallor and general white flabbiness so frequently seen in the city dweller. So, to good food, exercise, and rest in the well-balanced life, I would add all the direct, unfiltered sunlight possible in each working day, and lots more than that during vacations.

When once established, the balanced life fortunately becomes habitual. Indeed, it may be said to be made up of good habits both mental

and physical, the combined rhythm of which keeps it balanced. Regularity is the background of habit, but this regularity should never degenerate into obsessional rigidity, for there is need of elasticity in life. Regularity and elasticity are not necessarily incompatible; for instance, one can work for six days of the week and play on the seventh, but even this seven-day regularity can and should be broken by a monthly day or so of holiday or possibly, on occasion, by a few days of intensified work. Likewise, this monthly regularity should be broken by a longer seasonal vacation. Such irregularity gives to rhythm the grace and ease which avoid rigidity, and thus each day, in terms of work, rest, play, and exercise, will be as it should—a miniature of the week, of the month, and of the balanced year.

Considering the balance of life in terms of decades, elasticity, not only of habit but of attitude, is of the greatest importance, for we should meet the inevitable and often desirable physical, mental, economic, and social changes which mark the passing years with an elastic

attitude lest we find ourselves expelled from one stage of life into the next unprepared, protesting, and struggling, trying to hold to that which has passed, and refusing to use—much less to enjoy—that which is present. For instance, a child obviously needs more play in relation to work than does the young adult, and can be fed work only in small doses. It must become accustomed to the responsibility of work before it is ready to take up a full load; whereas the adult is presumably used to it, has accepted it, and finds it essential to success. If the child has had no training in responsibility and finds himself suddenly faced with it, if he is expelled from the playtime of life, without preparation, into maturity, he is only too apt to become bewildered or to rebel at such a disagreeable order of things and cling desperately to his old right to play. If, unfortunately, he has been guarded from responsibility all his life and had all things done for him, how can he be expected to take up his burden of responsibility just because he is grown up, especially if he has lots of money to pay others to do it for him? Indeed, the ungrown-up child of forty, especially

the "poor little rich" child who clings to his right to play on through life, presents one of the most difficult problems for readjustment.

Each decade has roughly its own appropriate inner balance between work, play, rest, and exercise, which is a biological necessity and must therefore gradually change to that appropriate to the next decade. Play should be far greater than work in the young child, and much more time should be given to exercise and rest in relation to work than in adolescence. In adult life much more time should be given to work than to play, less time to exercise, and a bit less time to rest. In middle life the work to play ratio may stay about the same, save toward the end of the period, when play, including hobbies, should begin to increase at the expense of work; work, though lessening in quantity, should show a continuous rise in quality; exercise, diminished in quantity, should be distinctly less violent and consequently more prolonged; golf rather than singles in tennis is appropriate for middle life, and can fortunately be carried on into old age, becoming more leisurely—nine holes rather than thirty-six, finesse rather than the long drive.

Each stage of life presents problems peculiar to itself, and no stage is more interesting from this point of view, or affords a better example of the fact that adaptation is an ever-changing, always present, and never completed process, than middle age. Take, for instance, the average middle-aged mother and wife. Her problem is a difficult one. Her children have long since acquired physiological independence. She no longer has the time-consuming details of their physical welfare to take care of. Their independence is proof that her labours in training have won success, and this success has shortened her working hours. Work, then, through success, has been diminished in quantity and changed in quality. School, by supplanting some of her efforts, has still further curtailed her job with the children. Again quantity of work has decreased and the quality changed, for now companionship, maturer friendship more on a basis of intellectual equality, sharing problems and responsibilities, has very largely replaced the technique of training and teaching. Finally, the children leave home, begin life on their own, build up outside responsibilities, carve their own way in the

world, and from the point of view of time at least, the mother's job, as such, with her children is over. The quality of the relationship has no doubt gone right ahead to higher levels of understanding, deeper sympathies, broader loyalties, more lasting mutual satisfaction, but the working hours formerly devoted to the children are empty; the effort they used to require is no longer needed.

The father and husband has this problem only in miniature. His work, in nine cases out of ten, has consisted of business or professional activities; and these have increased rather than decreased, both as to their demand on his time and the interest and satisfaction which they afford him. His graying hairs have meant more absorption in his job, but at the same time, the job being supported at least indirectly by the other members of the family, they look upon it not just as the family meal ticket but as the fruit of their combined labours. The father's place in the family as he arrives at middle-aged success is one of greater not less importance, greater not less honour. He has become more than ever the honoured author of prosperity and more than

ever the leader of the group. All this comes to him at middle age if he is just reasonably successful and well-behaved. From the physical point of view he also has the best of it, for his physical condition, as far as it can affect his social and professional success, has not yet shown any disquieting signs of deterioration. His power of being of importance to his fellow man and even to his fellow woman is measurably still up to satisfactory standard. But his middle-aged wife, who has not only borne the physiological burden of child bearing, but also the brunt, at least, of child rearing, not to speak of the always constant and often wearisome job of housekeeping, shows and feels, much more than he, the accumulated years. Furthermore, her physical condition is of greater emotional importance to her than his ever could be to him, for some at least of that indefinable quality of charm which is her particular birthright depends upon it. And then perhaps the greatest difference of all is that, whereas man is usually agreeably and gradually introduced to middle age, woman has it suddenly and often disagreeably announced to her by a more or less sudden physiological change

known as the menopause. The cessation of menstruation is in itself no great thing, but the significance of it is. The significance is what the woman reacts to and, unless she is well-informed on such matters, the significance is loaded with false ideas and groundless fears engendered by the thousand and one old wives' tales about "the change of life." These tales picture the menopause as a most dangerous period, a time when women are apt to "go crazy," as a process liable to produce all sorts of malign internal disorders, among them cancer and, perhaps worst of all, as a process which "unsexes." With all this in mind, no wonder that many a woman responds to the first irregularities of the menopause with depression, irritability, jealousy, and general nervousness, for is it not the dread signal that her life as a woman is over? Active motherhood ceased long ago; now, she mistakenly believes, wifehood also is about to cease. She sees the attraction and charm of womanhood about to disappear and nothing but old age left. Importance to those whom she most loves and is most dependent upon seems to be not only threatened but on the brink of destruction. In contrast to

her tragic state, the husband is in full enjoyment of all the powers that she feels she is about to lose. No wonder if she is depressed, no wonder if she is jealous, no wonder if she breaks under the strain. But, fortunately, all these old wives' tales are absolutely false, utterly untrue. The menopause is a comparatively simple affair, fraught with none of these fancied dangers; it is no more and no less than the perfectly natural and fortunate cessation of the child-bearing period. Except for being unable to bear children and being about to be freed from the nuisance of menstruation, the woman is just as much a woman as ever. Indeed, there is no reason why she should not be more charming, more desirable in every way throughout the period of middle age. Freed from a considerable physiological burden, she can be in an actually better and more stable emotional state and in more vigorous health, both mentally and physically, than before. Furthermore, freed from the time-consuming labours of child rearing and training, having presumably become so skilful in housekeeping that it takes but very little of her time, middle age should afford her the energy and leisure in

which to develop enjoyable hobbies, faintly outlined or only dreamed of in the busier years, or the opportunity of turning an avocation already established into a real vocation for which she never before had quite enough time. She is now free to be a really more important and active partner to her husband, a less limited friend to her friends, a more delightful and inspiring companion to her children no matter how infrequently she may see them, and a more informed and interested citizen in her community. So the menopause may be, can be, and should be merely the mildly disagreeable introduction into a better ordered, less interrupted, more peaceful, more constructively progressive, or, in brief, fuller and more satisfactory period of life.

A man has to meet much the same problem as a woman when he enters middle age, though it comes to him a few years later. He is not apt to react quite as frankly as she to the threatened loss of personal charm and power. He does not express his difficulty as she does in depression and a farewell-to-life attitude. Quite the contrary, he tends rather to show fight, to deny

the inroads of time, and makes often distinctly ridiculous and strenuous efforts to appear and be a decade or two younger than he is. This reaction to the threat of years explains the ludicrous rather than pitiful sight of a sedate middle-aged man suddenly becoming overactive socially, going the rounds, making much love to younger women and even young girls, dressing more modishly and rakishly than ever before, even in his salad days, and, in short, playing the part of the gayest of the gay young Lotharios. This behaviour is only the naïve expression of his fear that he is older than his years, an instinctive rebellion and, usually, quite innocent of other motives. It is a wise wife who can recognize the true nature of his ridiculous behaviour, and a clever one who can help him to regain his values without loss of self-respect. She is indeed both wise and clever if she can do this in spite of the naturally devastating effect that such behaviour tends to have on her own problem of meeting middle age cheerfully and gracefully.

The balanced life for both men and women, but I think especially for women, should include a gradual preparation for middle age. Working

hours should gradually diminish in relation to the hours for play and rest, but especially should these hours be given over more and more to some desirable avocation which shall take its proper and important place later on when, in the case of the woman, skill has reduced housekeeping to an hour or so and the job with the children has ceased, and when, in the man's case, advancing years have curtailed his job, at least as to time.

In old age work should be of the highest quality only. Inverse ratio of quality to quantity is almost always the rule, and it is not only desirable but necessary at this time of life. This can be a very enjoyable change, one characterized, for instance, by the absence of drudgery of detail and by greater demand for wisdom and judgment. It may amount in quality to the very quintessence of the old job. Rest should be increased in relation to work and exercise; the night's rest should be supplemented by a mid-day nap. Indeed, the midday rest is appropriate to middle age also, and might well be established then as a habit, needing only to be prolonged from a half hour or so to one or two hours in old

age. If the use of leisure has been wisely cultivated it should come into its full fruition in the evening of life, and much wisdom should come from it. The motto of a well-balanced life at any age is moderation, and as life advances this motto becomes of always greater importance until in old age it is a necessity.

However, to be successful in old age, as in all other ages, is not just an affair of living a well-balanced life nor one which is physically suited to the biological status of that age, but of having lived such a life through each decade; it then becomes largely a matter of attitude. It seems to me that the most successful and happy old people are those who have managed to take along with them what was best from each decade as they passed through it, and who at the same time have had the happy faculty of looking forward with much curiosity and perhaps even a little enthusiasm to the next stage. Indeed, their attitude seems to me to be characterized chiefly by elasticity. They have preserved their enthusiasm for new things. These gracefully young old people are interested in change, they welcome new developments, and do not oppose

them in the manner of crabbed old age with impotent rage as though every change were a sacrilegious destroyer of some ancient and venerated god. Nothing is more helpful or more inspiring, especially to the young, than an old man or woman whose way of living and whose attitude speak of enthusiasms undimmed, interest still keen, of friendliness, tolerance, and kindly wisdom. Old age then seems to be truly the happy fruition of a well-spent life, a time of harvest rather than a stage of decay.

In the grown-up family the children as they approach maturity have a problem to face in which they need their parents' help, but even failing this, one which they are nevertheless responsible for in at least equal measure with their parents. This problem is what might be termed the child-parent in contradistinction to the parent-child relation. It is non-existent in infancy, grows gradually and slowly, and exists as a full responsibility only when the children are grown and almost, if not quite, ready to go forth on their own. The problem centres about their responsibility for the welfare and happiness of their parents and for their intelligent contribution to

that objective. It is the same responsibility that exists in any other friendship, but it is of such slow growth and, furthermore, is from the beginning and for so long the parents' exclusive burden, that it is often only imperfectly defined and dimly realized by the children when their time comes. The standard moral obligations toward parents I do not here refer to. They are usually instilled from childhood, and almost every child actually does, or at least definitely feels he ought to, honour his father and mother, but few seem to realize their obligation to understand their parents so that they may contribute intelligently to their ultimate happiness. To wait on them, to contribute to their small present pleasure, and to defer to their little wants is not much more than the natural expression of affection and good manners. A small thing this. Certainly not worthy of very serious thought, let alone sacrifice, yet I have seen such minor services falsely glorified to be a life's work and, more than that, a splendid mission. The most pitiful thing in the world is a "remaining" daughter spending her whole intelligence and her great capacity for love and

citizenship upon the little pleasures and bodily comforts of an old father or mother. It is a criminally stupid neglect of the happiness both of the child and the parent by both the parent and the child. Ultimate and lasting happiness for the parent depends not upon the child's presence but upon his or her success. To sacrifice this success, the very thing the parents have striven to make their child capable of, and to sacrifice it for the mere pleasure of receiving personal ministrations, is to crown hope with disappointment and turn happiness into bitter regret. The older generation dies first; then, what of the child? The poor little job of being the parental hot-water bottle has ceased, and training, working associations, and opportunities having been neglected, the atrophied abilities of the middle-aged child are blocked and there is small chance of a fuller and more useful life. It is too late! A life has been given, and for what?

The ultimate happiness of the parents, not their immediate pleasure, should be the objective of the grown children. They are themselves mature and therefore responsible for choosing between the immediate and the ultimate good.

They should not forget that to help their children to be of use to others, to be able to applaud their citizenship, to share in their success, brings the greatest joy and the most lasting happiness to parents. To value this above their possibly querulous momentary demands is certainly a parental responsibility, but it is also, and I think chiefly, up to the child. It is, furthermore, solely up to the child, if either disease or old age has crippled the parental mind or dimmed the parental ideal. We are always responsible for carrying on in our lives the highest quality, the best influences that we have received from other lives, not the least, not the worst, so it is really a great injustice to parents if children, through sentiment or through yielding to parental emotionalism, do violence to that principle and when all is over have only their wasted lives to show as a monument to their parents. Such waste is a monument, not to parental love or to filial devotion, but to selfishness and stupidity. Every girl, as well as every boy, has a right to look forward to useful citizenship and to be trained and educated for that purpose. Civilization also has a right to demand this of

its citizens and, furthermore, does demand it. The family that has this as its objective is a productive unit of civilization, it is usually also a united family and one which remains united; moreover, it is one from which other useful and united families spring. The parent-child and child-parent relationships in such a family are progressive, coöperative, and well-balanced. The problem of taking care, and the best care, of the crippled, whether old or young, and especially loving care of the aged, is solved by the members of such a family wisely and happily but never by sacrificing the progress in usefulness of its growing or grown-up children. Only rarely is it necessary for a grown-up child to interrupt its career in order that it may care for its parents, except where there is poverty; even then the support of aged parents is possible only to the degree in which the child is a successful earner.

Throughout the decades men and women should be learning more and more to evaluate the emotions as only blind forces, and value more and more highly the power of understanding and directing these forces as the most precious and indispensable attribute of man's nature.

For to grow up, to grow middle aged, and to grow old gracefully, is not alone a matter of living a balanced life but largely one of attitude and understanding. To value the power of understanding above the demands of emotion, to value intelligence above instinct are to be aware of one's life in terms of its effect upon others. To be conscious of self in terms of purpose toward these lives, to identify one's happiness with the happiness of others, give the balanced life meaning, make it worth while and, scientifically speaking, are at once intelligent and ethical. It is only a waste of time to argue as to whether civilization is worth while or not, for it is necessary and unavoidable, a direct product of man's evolution, as much a biological fact as the swarming of bees—and as inevitable. Man as an individual has choice only as to what his relation to civilization is to be. He may try to oppose it, be antagonistic and non-coöperative, and society will treat him accordingly, either as an enemy or as a sick and irresponsible inadequate; or he may accept civilization as he finds it, make his relation to it that of contribution to its progress, and there again society will treat him accord-

ingly. In other words, man can either kick and struggle stupidly and helplessly against the forces of nature or use these forces, especially those within himself, intelligently and cleverly to aid him in leading a healthy, purposive, progressive life within the forward-flowing stream of civilization. There is an abundance of good reasons to be found in religion why a man ought to lead an ethical life. But the biological facts of his own nature and of the society which that nature has created, some of which I have described, constitute the fundamental and unavoidable reason why he *must* so live, or else lose his place in the evolutionary progress of his fellows.

A well-balanced, purposeful life is the unit of progressive civilization, and is, furthermore, a healthy life, a happy life, and all things being equal, a long life. This is true whether that life be dedicated to the "welfare of mankind" or to the "glory of God."

THE END

